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ABSTRACT

Palumbo, Mark V. Ph.D., Department of Psychology, Wright State University, 2007.
Cognitive Ability, Job Knowledge, and Stereotype Threat: When Does Adverse Impact
Occur?

This research compared the efficacy of a cognitive ability test and two types of
job knowledge tests for predicting job performance. Further, I examined job knowledge
as a mechanism through which cognitive ability affects performance. Finally, I examined
both types of tests relative to specific propositions from stereotype threat theory.
Specifically, I examined the propositions that perceptions of the tests may cause mean
score differences between Blacks and Whites and compared the effects of test perceptions
relative to both test types.
Results demonstrated that job knowledge accounted for significantly more
variance in task performance than cognitive ability. Furthermore, job knowledge
completely mediated the effects of cognitive ability on performance. However,
stereotype threat theory’s proposed test perceptions failed to account for mean test score
differences between the two groups. Rather, Blacks’ misperceptions relative to what
each test was designed to measure was found to be detrimental for test performance.
Also, regardless of what the test was designed to measure, Blacks still perceived both
types of tests as (stereotype) threatening.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The tests that employers use for personnel selection have an inherent risk of
adverse impact (A.I.), that is, the systematic bias against a particular group within the
labor market. Adverse impact in selection can be extremely costly to U. S. organizations.
A determination of adverse impact in a selection system often requires the company to reexamine existing methods and develop and/or implement alternative devices. Further, a
finding of adverse impact can force the company to pay out millions in damages. For
example, in the case of Robinson v. Ford Motor Company, Inc. (2004), in response to a
finding that their Apprentice Training Selection System test (ATSS) unfairly
discriminated against African Americans, Ford offered a settlement that included
suspension of their existing selection system, the hiring of an independent expert to
“design and validate an apprentice selection instrument, or instruments” (p. 5), and “pay
all reasonable costs and expenses associated with the work of the Expert” (p.6). Further,
Ford agreed to pay $2,400 to each of the 3,420 ‘Settlement Class Members’ (=
$8,208,000), each of the thirteen ‘Class Representatives’ and ‘Charging Parties’ the sum
of $30,000 (= $390,000), and $1,100,000 to the ‘Settlement Class Counsel’ with an
additional $567,000 to be awarded over the next three to five years (= $1,667,000). The
final cost to Ford was nearly $10 Million, not including the costs associated with the
company’s own legal fees, employee time and effort, and possible productivity lost due
to managing this lawsuit.
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As can be seen from the above example, lawsuits associated with adverse impact
are expensive. Moreover, the Ford lawsuit is but one that has been filed with the courts
in response to poor selection methods. The predictor used by Ford, its Apprentice
Training Selection System (ATSS) test, was found to be discriminatory, resulting in
disparate treatment against African Americans. Although using the ATSS may have been
effective in predicting training performance, the use of alternative selection methods, or
the identification of effective, alternative predictors may have avoided the lawsuit or
affected the court’s decision. In short, the use of alternative predictors may help protect
companies from the high costs that result from discrimination lawsuits. Thus it is
important to examine and extend existing research on prediction in order to identify
effective predictors that reduce incidence of unfair discrimination, i.e., adverse impact.
Research has demonstrated that cognitive ability is an effective predictor of
performance. However, the mechanisms through which cognitive ability affects
performance have yet to be identified completely, and these mechanisms might prove to
be better predictors of performance and result in less adverse impact. Schmidt and
Hunter (1998) speculated that cognitive ability affects performance indirectly through the
acquisition of job knowledge. Therefore, one purpose of this study is to test job
knowledge as a mediator of cognitive ability effects on performance. However, the
strength of this mediation effect may depend on how we define and measure job
knowledge (Palumbo, 2004). More specifically, current definitions of job knowledge
may limit our ability to assess adequately the influence of job knowledge on
performance. Therefore, a second purpose of this study is to extend current definitions of
job knowledge and to test different measures of job knowledge as mediators of the
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cognitive ability - performance relationship. Furthermore, it may be the case that job
knowledge is actually a better predictor of performance than cognitive ability (Palumbo,
Miller, Steele-Johnson, & Shalin, 2005). Again, this may depend on how job knowledge
is defined and measured (Palumbo, 2004). Thus, a third purpose of this study is to
compare the efficacy of cognitive ability and these different types of job knowledge tests
in predicting performance.
Despite its role as an effective predictor of performance, cognitive ability tests
often results in subgroup score differences, thereby resulting in adverse impact on
selection (Farr, 2003; Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 2001; Sackett & Ellingson, 1997).
Research is underway to identify possible causes of the subgroup test score differences
(e.g., Ellis & Ryan, 2003; Hausdorf, LeBlanc & Chawla, 2003). One such factor that has
been proposed is stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Steele, 1997). If job
knowledge is equal to cognitive ability in predicting performance, and if job knowledge
tests demonstrate smaller subgroup score differences relative to cognitive ability tests
because of the absence of stereotype threat that affects cognitive ability tests, then job
knowledge tests might decrease the instances of adverse impact and offer a viable
alternative to the use of cognitive ability tests. Therefore, the final purpose of this study
is to provide a preliminary examination of stereotype threat as it relates to cognitive
ability and job knowledge tests.
Cognitive Ability
Cognitive ability test purpose. Cognitive ability tests are used often in employee
selection procedures due to their low cost and ease of administration. More importantly,
apart from administrative efficiency, cognitive ability tests have been seen as effective
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predictors of performance, having a validity coefficient ranging from .23 for unskilled
(labor) jobs to .58 for ‘professional-managerial jobs’ (Hunter & Schmidt, 1996; Schmidt
& Hunter, 1998). Therefore, cognitive ability tests are widely used in industry for initial
job candidate selection and selection for entry into job-related training programs.
The nature of the construct of cognitive ability. “Cognitive ability” is the term
used to describe a general ability factor. This factor is operationally defined as the
common variance shared by tests of specific abilities (Hough & Oswald, 2000). More
specifically, tests of various specific (mental) abilities (e.g., spatial ability, verbal ability,
numerical ability, etc.) are positively intercorrelated, and the mental ability that is
reflected by that shared variance is labeled cognitive ability. Sometimes referred to as g1,
(e.g., Ree & Earles, 1991; Ree, Earles, & Teachout, 1994), or Spearman’s g (e.g.,
Conway, Kane, & Engle, 2003), IQ (e.g., Rushton & Jensen, 2005), or general mental
ability (GMA) (e.g., Schmidt & Hunter, 1998; Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986),
this common variance is identified as “the general factor common to diverse cognitive
tests” (Jensen, 1995. p.42). Furthermore, this general factor accounts for a greater
proportion of the overall variance in all of the tests than any other factor (Nyborg &
Jensen, 2000).
Cognitive ability as intelligence. Cognitive ability is often viewed as intelligence.
This view is evident in statements made by researchers throughout existing literature.
For example, in her discussion regarding ‘cultural equivalence’ of cognitive ability tests
(CATs), Helms (1992) stated that in her view, “CATs refers to those measures designed
to assess intelligence, mental abilities, cognitive abilities, and scholastic aptitude
because,..., these terms are virtually synonymous.” (p. 1083). Also, in his meta-analysis
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of the literature regarding performance prediction, Hunter (1986) stated that “‘general
cognitive ability’ is used here in place of the term ‘intelligence’” (p. 341). Thus, a
common theme that extends through the literature is that general cognitive ability and
general intelligence are different labels for the same construct.
Intelligence is described as an individual difference factor relating to one’s ability
to understand complex ideas, adapt to one’s surroundings, learn from experience, engage
in reasoning, and surmount obstacles mentally (Neisser, Boodoo, Bouchard, Boykin,
Brody, Ceci, Halpern, Loehlin, Perloff, Sternberg, & Urbina, 1996). Additionally,
intelligence is considered to be “essentially stable in its nature throughout life” (Vernon,
1979, p. 8). Neisser et al., (1996) agree with this perspective of the stability of
intelligence, as evidenced by their ongoing discussion of intelligence as a stable,
dispositional trait. Thus, if cognitive ability is intelligence, and intelligence is a relatively
stable, dispositional trait, then cognitive ability also must be viewed as a relatively stable
construct.
Relationship to performance. As stated earlier, cognitive ability tests are
commonly used in selection because of their relative effectiveness for predicting
performance. Regarding attempts to improve validity in predicting job performance,
Tenopyr (2002) wrote that, “Emphasis on g appears to have been the most fruitful
approach.” (p. 113). Thus, researchers have focused on demonstrating the effectiveness
of cognitive ability (g) as a predictor (e.g., Hunter, 1986; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). The
results of much of this research have demonstrated that cognitive ability is the best,
general predictor of performance across a variety of jobs (Gottfredson, 2002; Hunter &
Schmidt, 1996; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). In fact, Hunter (1986) went so far as to say
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that “general cognitive ability predicts job performance in all jobs” (p. 340) although he
noted also that job complexity affected the predictive validity of cognitive ability tests.
More specifically, in his meta-analysis of hundreds of studies examining cognitive ability
effects on performance ratings, Hunter (1986) reported a validity coefficient of .58 for
high complexity jobs, .51 for medium complexity jobs, and .40 for low complexity jobs.
Further, for individuals without prior experience on the job, general mental ability
(GMA) is the most valid predictor of future performance and learning (Schmidt &
Hunter, 1998). Specifically, general mental ability has been shown to predict
“performance (amount learned) in job training programs” with an average predictive
validity of .56 (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998, p. 266). This statement is important because it
addresses not only the role of cognitive ability in selection for future performance, but
more importantly, it addresses also the role of cognitive ability in learning. Specifically,
not only does cognitive ability predict job performance, but it effectively predicts also the
acquisition of job-relevant knowledge. Therefore, cognitive ability tests are seen as
effective for choosing among individuals with no previous job knowledge to be assigned
to formal training programs.
Relationship to adverse impact. One limitation of the use of cognitive ability tests
in selection is that these tests often result in subgroup score differences, thereby resulting
in adverse impact on selection of entire subgroups (Farr, 2003; Hough, Oswald, &
Ployhart, 2001; Sackett & Ellingson, 1997). More specifically, observed scores for
blacks are, in general, approximately one standard deviation (1 SD) lower than for whites
on cognitive ability tests (Hunter & Hunter, 1984; Sackett & Ellingson, 1997). The use
of cognitive ability test scores for selection decisions results in relatively fewer minorities
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hired, i.e., adverse impact (Hough, Oswald, & Ployhart, 2001). Thus, the use of
cognitive ability tests for selection often results in adverse impact.
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act (1964) and the Tower Amendment (Section
703h, Civil Rights Act, 1964) prohibit intentional discrimination in personnel decisions
based on race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. Subsequent cases (e.g., Griggs v.
Duke Power Co., U. S, Supreme Court, 1971) exposed the possibility of the unintentional
discrimination against members of these protected groups when tests scores differ for
their members from those achieved by majority members. Thus, the courts eventually
defined adverse impact as unintentional discrimination centered on the negative effects
of a measure or selection test for women and minority groups (U. S. Supreme Court,
1971). If a court determines that a selection system does, in fact, exhibit adverse impact,
the employer must demonstrate that the selection system is job relevant and that business
necessity exists for its use (Aramburu-Zabala Higuera, 2001).
To address the issue of possible adverse impact in selection testing, researchers
have begun to examine alternatives to the traditional use of cognitive ability alone as a
predictor of performance, such as the use of multiple predictors in the selection process
or the inclusion of alternative measures of performance in the criterion. Furthermore,
despite Sackett and Ellingson’s (1997) demonstration of the limited benefit of using
multiple predictors, other researchers have continued to call for the inclusion of even
more predictors (both cognitive and non-cognitive) in the selection battery and/or the
further expansion of the criterion domain (e.g., Goldstein, Zedeck, & Goldstein, 2002;
Helms, 2002).
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In terms of finding better sets of predictors, researchers have begun to attempt to
identify factors that may have an effect in the race – cognitive ability testing relationship.
For example, Ellis and Ryan (2003) examined the mediating effects of test preparation,
test-taking strategy use, and self-efficacy in the relationship. They found that although
blacks reported having received more test preparation training than whites, reported using
more test-taking strategies than whites, and reported high levels of test-taking selfefficacy, blacks scored lower than whites on a cognitive ability test. Ellis and Ryan
attributed the lower scores to the greater use of ineffective strategies by blacks than by
whites.
Researchers have examined also the efficacy of using alternate types of cognitive
ability tests. For example, to examine the question that the mean score differences may
be caused by a reading comprehension factor inherent in certain cognitive ability tests
(e.g., the Wonderlic ), Hausdorf, LeBlanc, and Chawla (2003) compared performance on
the General Aptitude Test Battery (GATB) to that on the Raven’s SPM. Hausdorf et al.
found that both tests resulted in similar levels of black-white score differences, and
therefore, the use of either type of cognitive ability test would result in adverse impact
against minority candidates.
Finally, researchers have begun to attempt to identify alternative approaches to
assessment that would reduce or eliminate the occurrence of adverse impact in selection.
One approach that has been explored in the selection literature is the use of multiple
predictors for hiring decisions. For example, Helms (2002) suggested the use of "cultural
identification" measures along with tests of cognitive ability. Also, Goldstein, Zedeck,
and Goldstein (2002) supported the idea of including even more cognitive and non-
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cognitive predictors in the selection battery. To this end, researchers have examined the
effectiveness of adding other predictors to tests of cognitive ability, thereby creating a
composite for the purpose of reducing subgroup differences (e.g., Baron & Janmen, 1996;
Sackett & Ellingson, 1997). One approach has combined predictors in assessment
centers (ACs). Typically, assessment centers are designed as simulations of the work
environment where trained raters observe and evaluate applicants’ behavior in an attempt
to successfully predict future performance. (See Cascio, 1998, for a detailed discussion
of assessment center methodology). Baron and Janmen (1996) found that in assessment
centers, test scores differences exist between racial groups but that the differences were
not as large as those found with cognitive ability tests. However, in their meta-analysis
of these efforts, Sackett and Ellingson (1997) demonstrated the limited effectiveness of
adding more predictors alone. More specifically, these authors found that most of the
change in the relationship between predictor and subgroup score difference occurs when
the first two or three predictors are added to cognitive ability tests to create the
composite. The addition of further (4 or more) predictors provides diminishing gains, if
any.
Another approach to reducing adverse impact seemed to redefine testing criteria
or use other types of tests. For example, Barret, Carobine, and Doverspike (1999) were
able to demonstrate reduced black-white subgroup differences by using short term
memory (STM) tests. In this case, whereas cognitive ability tests produced a subgroup
score difference of .80, the difference on the short term memory test was .39.
Furthermore, Verive and McDaniel (1996) demonstrated that the scores on short term
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memory tests and job performance were highly correlated (r = .45), thereby providing
evidence for the validity of these measures.
Additionally, there is evidence that work sample tests reduce adverse impact
(Aramburu-Zabala Higuera, 2001). Moreover, work sample tests have been found to
have predictive validity that is equal to or greater than other, paper and pencil measures
(Aramburu-Zabala Higuera, 2001; Cascio & Phillips, 1979). Similarly, Schmidt &
Hunter (1998) demonstrated that work sample measures were slightly more valid for
predicting performance than measures of general mental ability [correlations with
performance (rs) = .54 and .51 for work sample measures and general mental ability
(GMA) measures, respectively].
An important point here is that the use of work sample tests represents a ‘shift’
from the practice of using ‘signs’ of ability for selection to the use of ‘samples’ of jobrelated behavior to predict future job performance. More specifically, rather than using
general cognitive ability (a well-established sign of general ability and one that is
inexpensive to administer measures of) to predict performance, this line of research has
focused on actual samples of work and the knowledge that guides decision-making about
the job. There is evidence to suggest that work samples produce lower adverse impact
and provide reliable predictors of both training performance and job performance (Hough
& Oswald, 2000). Thus, a work sample approach to adverse impact mitigation merits
further exploration.
This ‘samples’ approach moves testing closer to issues of content and job-related
understanding and is consistent with legal requirement to relate testing procedures to job
requirements. Wernimont and Campbell (1968) based selection on a work sample model,
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proposing the idea of behavioral consistency, i.e., that prior performance predicts future
performance. These authors argued that in attempts to predict job behavior “it will be
much more fruitful to focus on meaningful samples of behavior, rather than signs of
predispositions, as predictors of later performance.” (p. 372). Thus, researchers have
implemented the use of situational tests as a measure of existing judgment that could be
used to predict decision-making in the future (e.g., Lievens & Coetsier, 2002).
Situational judgment tests require the individual to make decisions based upon their
understanding of the information provided, the declarative content of the task, and their
pre-existing knowledge regarding this type of task or scenario. More specifically,
situational judgment tests place individuals into an hypothetical problem scenario and
require them to resolve the problem. Resolution requires individuals to apply their
existing knowledge above and beyond the task content provided. In implementing this
idea as it related to adverse impact, Lievens and Coetsier (2002) were able to demonstrate
that situational tests added 3.1% predictive validity over cognitive ability tests.
In the current study, I focused on the use of sample measures (job knowledge)
rather than sign measures (cognitive ability) as predictors of performance, in order to
examine black-white differences. Thus, this study was designed to extend existing
research using this ‘behavioral consistency’ approach by examining the effectiveness of
using ‘sample’ measures other than situational tests. Further, this study will extend
previous, preliminary research (e.g., Hunter, 1993; Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge,
1986; Palumbo, 2004; Palumbo, Miller, Steele-Johnson, & Shalin, 2005) that has
demonstrated that job knowledge mediates the relationship between cognitive ability and
performance.
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In summary, despite much research demonstrating the possibility of alleviating
adverse impact, cognitive ability tests continue to be used in selection and the use of
cognitive ability tests continues to result in significant black-white mean score
differences. Regarding black-white mean test score differences, Farr (2003) wrote,
“These mean test performance differences have been quite resistant to change, despite the
number of approaches that have been attempted” (p. 179). Furthermore, according to
Sackett and Ellingson (1997), these "commonly observed black-white score differences
produce violations of the four-fifths rule at all but the very highest selection ratios" (p.
712). Thus, continued use of cognitive ability tests in predicting performance is likely to
be paralleled by continued adverse impact. Therefore, it seems important to continue the
search for alternative tests that reduce adverse impact and to identify factors that may
contribute to these score differences, and alleviate the cause of these differences, if
possible.
Job Knowledge
Job knowledge test purpose. In industry, paper-and-pencil job knowledge tests
are used for candidate selection, job placement, training assignment decisions, and
organizational advancement considerations. Paper-and-pencil job knowledge tests are
seen as practical for measuring job performance because of the relatively low cost and
ease of their administration. Additionally, these paper-and-pencil tests are correlated
with hands-on measures of job performance, although the correlations are not strong
enough to support the use of paper-and-pencil job knowledge tests as a substitute for
hands-on measures, i.e., physical job samples (Dubois & Shalin, 1995). Further, similar
to hands-on measures, paper-and-pencil job knowledge tests are considered to be samples
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of the task(s) performed on the job. Thus, written tests are designed to reflect the
requirements for successful job performance. The degree of content validity is a measure
of the amount of overlap between test content and the job.
However, the use of paper-and-pencil job knowledge tests rather than the use of
cognitive ability tests may increase ultimately the cost of the selection system. More
specifically, although inexpensive to administer, paper-and-pencil job knowledge tests
may be expensive to develop, depending on the nature of the information to be assessed.
Thus, the use of job knowledge tests may increase organizational costs beyond that
realized by the use of existing, marketed cognitive ability tests. Therefore, the use of job
knowledge tests is dictated only to the extent that they offer better prediction.
The nature of the construct of job knowledge. Job knowledge may be viewed as
knowledge within the context of, and relevant to, the job. Simply put, we are addressing
the construct of knowledge in general but as it applies to the specific context of work.
This general construct (knowledge) has been researched thoroughly over the past few
decades by cognitive scientists (e.g., Greeno, 1989). Thus, to understand job knowledge,
we must begin with an examination of the literature on knowledge that exists in cognitive
psychology.
Cognitive literature on knowledge. In the literature from cognitive psychology,
job knowledge is viewed as a multi-faceted construct. Cognitive researchers have
identified many specific types of knowledge. These separate knowledge types interact
with one another to contribute to task success. Thus, job knowledge, as a whole, may be
viewed as a combination of these distinct yet interacting knowledge components.
Therefore, all of these distinct types of knowledge should be valued by
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industrial/organizational (I/O) psychologists interested in the development of job
knowledge tests.
Initially, cognitive researchers focused on identifying the basic types of
knowledge that were associated directly with the content of the task. Early research
identified two types of task-related knowledge: declarative and procedural. Anderson,
Greeno, Kline, and Neves (1981) described declarative knowledge as knowledge of the
factual, descriptive information associated with the task. Additionally, Anderson et al.
(1981) described procedural knowledge as the knowledge involved in executing the task
processes. More specifically, according to Anderson (1997) (who, incidentally, seems to
be one of the few cognitive researchers who continues to focus on declarative and
procedural knowledge to date), procedural knowledge specifies how we use declarative
knowledge to solve problems. Thus, procedural knowledge is knowledge of how to do
the task and is therefore essential in task completion. Further, in their discussion of
knowledge acquisition, Anderson et al. (1981) stated that these two types of knowledge
are acquired relatively early in the (task) learning process (to be discussed later in more
detail as it relates to the industrial/organizational conceptualization of job knowledge).
However, cognitive researchers, including some of those mentioned above,
seemed to recognize that this early view of job knowledge may have been limited
because it addressed only some of the information (knowledge) needed to successfully
perform a task (e.g., Greeno, Riley, & Gelman, 1984). More specifically, this view of job
knowledge included only the identification of knowledge of a set of actions or subtasks to
be accomplished within a given task and the procedures used to accomplish those actions.
Thus, this view concentrated only on the ‘Whats?’ and ‘Hows?’ that are included in the
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task. Many modern jobs have evolved into dynamic activities that often involve shifting
our focus, prioritizing our actions, and making appropriate decisions. In this arena,
adaptability is often the key to success. Therefore, researchers began to expand their
efforts to include also the identification of the more qualitative components of job
knowledge that enable adaptation.
A more general view of the combination of declarative and procedural knowledge
is ontological knowledge. Ontology refers to the objects in a task and their relationships
with one another (Greeno, 1989). Thus, ontological knowledge is the understanding of
the relations between task elements and how each element affects the others.
Additional qualitative task knowledge components that have been identified in the
literature include explanatory knowledge, tacit knowledge, and goal-recognition
knowledge. Explanatory knowledge supplies the justification for a procedure to be used
within a given task (Greeno, Riley, & Gelman, 1984). Tacit, decision-making knowledge
is knowledge that is “not openly expressed or readily stated” (Hedlund, Forsythe,
Horvath, Williams, Snook, & Sternberg, 2003, p. 117; Schmidt & Hunter, 1993) and is
believed to be acquired directly from the task and to increase with experience (Sternberg,
1985). Finally, goal-recognition knowledge associates the recognition of task outcome
requirements with the understanding of the processes required for successful completion
(Greeno & Simon, 1988).
All of these qualitative knowledge components contribute to task performance by
supplying task-relevant information above and beyond the ‘Whats?’ and ‘Hows?’ of the
task. Therefore the identification of these components allows us to begin to identify also
the individual's knowledge of why and when to do which task procedure. Deciding how
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to prioritize and when and how to implement subtasks often involves planning, an
awareness of existing resources and their ‘appropriate’ allocation, an awareness and
understanding of existing conditions, an understanding of the interrelatedness of all parts
of the task, and a focus on future goals. Thus, the ‘Whens?’ of a task seem to be driven
by these different yet integrated qualitative types of knowledge.
Finally, and perhaps most importantly, it seems that our conceptualization of job
knowledge must include knowledge of the “Whys?” of a task. It is the 'Whys?' that
determine our choice of which action or procedure to implement. Knowing the ‘Why?’
allows us to prioritize subtasks, to determine choices. Thus, knowing the ‘Why?’ often
allows us to determine the ‘When?”. Knowing the ‘Why?’ allows us to reason about a
task and/or reason through serial task requirements. Knowing the ‘Why?’ allows us to
solve problems. Knowing the ‘Why?’ allows us to search for analogous instances or
situations. Therefore, knowing the ‘Why?’ allows us to generalize our knowledge, to
recognize similar situations and implement previously successful strategies. In short,
knowing the ‘Why?’ allows us to succeed in the job. Therefore, knowing the ‘Why?’
must be included in any conceptualization of the knowledge that is necessary to do the
job, or ‘job knowledge’. The qualitative components of job knowledge that have been
identified in the cognitive research afford that necessary inclusion because they do
address the ‘Whys?’ that drive job performance.
Furthermore, researchers have begun to realize that the acquisition of job
knowledge occurs within a given, specific situation and more recent literature has
included this idea (e.g., Greeno, 1989; Lave & Wenger, 1991).
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Job knowledge as malleable (vs. stable). In the cognitive literature, knowledge is
viewed as malleable, an outcome of the ongoing process of learning. Anderson et al.
(1981) described the learning process as iterative wherein individuals acquire declarative
knowledge first and then procedural. Also, research has demonstrated that throughout the
learning process, individuals were able to acquire increasing levels of various types of
competencies (due to increasing knowledge) regarding a particular task (e.g., Greeno,
Riley, & Gelman, 1984; Smith, Greeno, & Vitolo, 1989). Similarly, task-related tacit
knowledge is believed to increase with experience (Sternberg, 1985). Furthermore,
research on expert-novice differences has demonstrated that, as more learning occurs,
individuals categorize problems more effectively and reason more effectively about their
solutions (e.g., Chi, Feltovich, & Glaser, 1996; Van Lehn, 1996). Thus, there is ample
evidence that knowledge changes over time and is therefore malleable, and presumably,
this malleability extends to all types of knowledge.
Current industrial/organizational conceptualizations of job knowledge. In
industrial/organizational research and practice, our conceptualization of job knowledge
comes from our conceptualization of work. Our conceptualization of job knowledge,
then, drives how we operationally define job knowledge. We have derived much of our
current concept from research in cognitive psychology. However, our current concept
may be limited because we may have overlooked some of the relevant constructs that
cognitive research has to offer. As industrial/organizational psychologists, we must
consider also cognitive research that addresses types of knowledge that contribute to our
ability to adapt our thinking. In short, whereas job knowledge is conceptualized quite
broadly in the cognitive literature, the industrial/organizational concept is much narrower.
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Therefore, we should continue to borrow from our cognitive colleagues in order to extend
our conceptualization of job knowledge and thus, our definition.
Existing industrial/organizational operational definitions identify job knowledge
as technical information, facts, and procedures required to do the job (e.g., Hunter, 1993;
Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986). Additionally, industrial/organizational
researchers have used variations of the concept of job knowledge. For example, Schmidt
et al. (1986) assessed job knowledge through "written measures of facts, principles, and
so forth, needed to perform the job" (p.433). Additionally, in his examination of the
effects of conceptions of ability on learning, Martocchio (1994) limited his assessment of
the knowledge that was acquired during training to that of declarative knowledge only.
Also, in their examination of goal orientation and ability effects on knowledge, Bell and
Kozlowski (2002a) limited their basic knowledge test to one that assessed declarative
knowledge. Similarly, Fisher and Ford (1998) investigated the effects of individual effort
and goal orientation on knowledge. However, as they described, their knowledge
measure focused on “facts found in the text of” the learning materials provided (p. 407).
Thus, this particular knowledge test assessed also declarative knowledge only. Thus, in
practice, industrial/organizational psychologists have focused, at least partially, on
declarative knowledge ("facts") in their operational definition of job knowledge.
Furthermore, the approach of focusing on facts supplied in training materials used by
Fisher and Ford (1998) also puts the burden of task analysis on trainers. Thus, Fisher and
Ford’s (1998) approach may be risky, because, in this case, these trainers may be likely to
identify only those aspects of knowledge that lend themselves to formal training.
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Hunter (1993) extended the concept of job knowledge beyond the declarative by
defining job knowledge as "knowledge of the technical information about objects and
concepts required to do the job and knowledge of processes and judgmental criteria
required for efficient or correct action on the job" (p.258). Thus, according to Hunter's
(1993) definition, job knowledge consists of a combination of declarative and procedural
knowledge. Similar definitions can be found elsewhere in the literature. For example, in
their discussion of the effects of adaptive guidance on several training outcomes, Bell and
Kozlowski (2002b) refer to basic (task) knowledge as "the fundamental principles and
operations of a task" (p. 273). Yet, their measure of basic knowledge was a composite of
these two knowledge types. Thus, it seems that basic knowledge, also, is seen as a
combination of declarative and procedural knowledge only.
Thus, industrial/organizational practitioners have a well-established history of
focusing on these two types of knowledge. However, to reiterate, this view of job
knowledge may be limited, because of its limited focus on knowledge of a particular set
of actions and/or the procedures used to accomplish those actions. Again, in today's jobs,
adaptability is a requisite for success, but a concept that we in industrial/organizational
psychology have yet to consider fully. Therefore, our concept of what work is, and thus
what job knowledge is, may be out-dated. We seem to view work as a series of tasks to
be performed while on the job. Therefore, we continue to concentrate on the ‘Whats?’
and ‘Hows?’ that are included in the task. This is an important first step, because the
‘Whats?’ and ‘Hows?’ are imperative for task success and therefore must be considered
an integral part of our concept of job knowledge. However, it may be the case that we
often omit the ‘Whens?’ of a task from our thinking.

19

An exception to this scenario involves the type of task in which success requires
subtasks to be performed in a specified sequence or order. In this type of (often static)
ordered task, the ‘When?’ refers to the order of operations for subtasks to be carried out.
For example, when performing Cardio-Pulmonary Resuscitation (C.P.R.), all subtasks
must be accomplished in the correct order for the task to be successful.2 In this type of
task, the ‘When?’ refers to the correct “ordered set” of procedures or subtasks, and the
knowledge of the procedural set would be included in our (industrial/organizational)
overall concept of job knowledge. In sum, we in industrial/organization psychology are
accomplished at including the ‘Whats?’, ‘Hows?’, and, in specific, ordered cases, even
the ‘Whens?’ of a task in our conceptualization of job knowledge.
However, as discussed earlier also, this set of facts and procedures may not reflect
the complete nature of the job requirements. If the task is dynamic and involves
discretionary decision-making, as is the case with many of today’s jobs, knowing when to
do which procedure may depend on other information, the ‘Why?’. Thus, the ‘when’
seems to be driven by those different, yet integrated qualitative types of knowledge
identified in the cognitive literature. These knowledge types represent the ‘Whys?’ of the
task, and therefore these should become integrated into our conceptualization of job
knowledge also.
This is not to say that industrial/organizational psychologists are not interested in
the ‘Whys?’ of a task. In fact, recently, some research has begun to address the role of
the effects of 'other' types of knowledge on performance. For example, in their
examination of the relationship between goal orientation, learning strategies, learning
outcomes, and the transfer of knowledge, Ford, Smith Weissbein, Gully, and Salas (1998)
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administered a test that attempted to assess both declarative and strategic knowledge.
However, according to their description, the test consisted of only nine items, “several”
(of which), according to the authors, “tapped declarative knowledge” (p. 225). Thus,
their test could include very few items that “were written to assess strategic knowledge of
the most efficient way to access information cues...and how to prioritize targets...” (p.
225). Also, their test did not include any assessment of procedural knowledge. Thus, it
eliminated any opportunity to assess one of the important ‘basic’ building blocks of
knowledge that contribute to the strategic. Therefore, although their approach was a
positive attempt to assess knowledge beyond the declarative, the test used by these
authors may have provided an incomplete assessment of knowledge because of its limited
length and scope.
Additionally, in both studies mentioned earlier, Bell and Kozlowski (2002a,
2002b) described the possible role of "strategic" knowledge (also identified as ‘tacit’ by
these authors) and included a measure of this knowledge type in their research. Bell and
Kozlowski (2002b) described strategic knowledge as “the extent to which a trainee has
learned the underlying or deeper complexities of a task” (p. 273). However, because
their description failed to address any of the other qualitative types of knowledge that
may interact to influence the strategic, their measure of this type of knowledge had
similar shortcomings. Further, Fisher and Ford (1998) identified application
(knowledge) as a second outcome of learning, and implemented a measure of application
in their study. However, similar to Bell and Kozlowski (2002b), Fisher and Ford (1998)
failed to capture any other knowledge types. Thus, although this research adds the idea
of strategic or application knowledge to our concept of job/task knowledge, its
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effectiveness may be limited because it omits any assessment of the other, qualitative
types of knowledge. Through this omission, we eliminate also any opportunity to
identify accurately and systematically all that has been learned. This could have
detrimental effects on our attempts at training evaluation, especially, by limiting our
ability to determine what type(s) and how much of the intended information the
individual has acquired during the training.
Thus, the current industrial/organizational definition of job knowledge may limit
our ability to adequately assess the knowledge that the individual must possess to
successfully perform a task because the focus of our definition may be too narrow to
allow us to assess other knowledge types that influence successful task performance. For
example, this definition overlooks the influence of explanatory and goal knowledge
(Dubois & Shalin, 1997), among others. Further, our conceptualization of job knowledge
determines how we attempt to measure the construct. More specifically, our general
conceptualization of job knowledge drives how we operationally define job knowledge
and this definition, in turn, acts as a guiding force in our approach to developing job
knowledge tests.
Thus, in industrial/organizational psychology, the construct of job knowledge has
not been well-defined, the definition being too narrow in its focus, even in some of the
more recent papers (e.g., Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). Therefore, researchers should
examine more fully the construct of job knowledge. Specifically, I propose that we
should expand the current definition of job knowledge to encompass the individual’s
overall understanding of the task, that is, how to apply job-specific information for
successful task completion. I suggest that research that expands the definition beyond
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declarative and procedural knowledge to include knowledge regarding the appropriate
application of job-specific information might be more informative about the candidate’s
level of knowledge about the task. Potential benefits might be a better understanding of
the knowledge-performance relationship, improved prediction, and/or decreased
incidence of adverse impact.
Distinction between basic knowledge and understanding. Although all taskrelated knowledge comes from the content of the task, it is important to distinguish
between various types of knowledge relative to their ability to predict performance.
Therefore, for the purposes of this study, basic knowledge has been identified as a
combination of declarative and procedural knowledge, and the measure of basic
knowledge was a composite of these two knowledge types as described by Bell and
Kozlowski (2002).
Understanding necessarily subsumes declarative and procedural knowledge in that
both are necessary precursors to the decision-making process. Thus, task
“understanding” is defined as the appropriate combination of declarative, procedural,
ontological, explanatory, tacit, and goal-recognition knowledge. To clarify, by ‘the
appropriate combination’ I mean that combination which allows the individual to
accurately, successfully complete the task.
However, I suggest that the measure of understanding need not assess declarative
and/or procedural knowledge directly because of the assumption that both knowledge
types are present in the individual’s knowledge repertoire. This combination can only be
assessed by determining what priorities are assigned, what choices are made, and what
procedures are applied. In this case, tests developed by traditional
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industrial/organizational methods may not capture job knowledge adequately because we
have yet to include understanding as part of our conceptualization of job knowledge to
date. Thus, there seems to be no existing method in industrial/organizational psychology
that systematically assesses the complete set of qualitative knowledge types that I call
“understanding.” Therefore, for the purposes of this study, the measure of understanding
was developed using Dubois and Shalin’s (1995, 1997) approach. The test was designed
to assess the individual’s understanding of the appropriate application of the more
qualitative types of knowledge relative to the task at hand.
Relationship to performance. As stated earlier, substantial research has
demonstrated that cognitive ability is an effective predictor of performance (e.g.,
Gottfredson, 2002; Hunter & Schmidt, 1996; Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). There has been
less research examining job knowledge effects on performance. However, these studies
have demonstrated that job knowledge is an effective predictor of performance (e.g.,
Hunter & Schmidt, 1996; Palumbo Miller, Steele-Johnson, & Shalin, 2005; Schmidt &
Hunter, 1998). Moreover, much of the existing work has examined job knowledge in the
context of mediation. For example, Schmidt and Hunter (1998) speculated that cognitive
ability affects performance indirectly through the acquisition of job knowledge. Other
existing research has demonstrated that job knowledge functions as a mediator between
cognitive ability and its effect on performance (Hunter, 1993; Hunter & Schmidt, 1996,
Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). However, in these studies, job knowledge only partially
mediated the effects. Furthermore, Schmidt et al (1986) suggested that the job
knowledge effect was moderated by the sample, observing stronger effects in military
samples than in civilian samples, perhaps due to the military’s emphasis on procedures.
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More recently, job knowledge has been shown to completely mediate cognitive
ability effects on performance and account for significantly more of the variance in
performance than cognitive ability (Palumbo et al, 2005). The apparent difference in
these findings was related to how job knowledge was defined, and ultimately measured
(Palumbo, 2004). Thus, the ability of job knowledge to mediate cognitive ability effects
on performance may depend on how we measure job knowledge.
Relationship to adverse impact. As stated earlier also, job relevance of selection
tests is one requirement of adverse impact legislation. More specifically, if a selection
test/battery is determined to be discriminatory, the organization must provide evidence
that the information addressed by the test is related to the job for which it is used. Job
knowledge tests are clearly job related because they are samples of the knowledge that is
required for job success and thus are designed to effectively predict job performance.
Therefore, the use of job knowledge tests (‘samples’) represents a more legallydefensible selection device than the use of cognitive ability tests (‘signs’) to predict
performance.
Test Design
The assessment of job knowledge requires the creation of job-specific
measure(s)/test(s). Different approaches to test development can be found in the
literature. Generally speaking, current industrial/organizational job knowledge test
development procedures may be limited by current conceptual and operational definitions
of job knowledge. Therefore, I suggest that it may be beneficial for
industrial/organizational researchers to examine an alternative to the current approach to
job knowledge test development that may extend our definition of job knowledge.
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Specifically, I propose that a cognitively-oriented approach to test development will
provide a more complete picture of job knowledge.
Existing industrial/organizational test-design methods. Traditionally, in
industrial/organizational psychology, the process of constructing job knowledge tests
begins with an analysis of the job. In this analysis process, subject matter experts
(SMEs), usually job incumbents and/or job supervisors, identify individual tasks,
behaviors, and abilities that are necessary for successful task performance. (See Cascio,
1998, for a detailed discussion of the test development process.) This identification
process results in the definition of the task domain by identifying categories of
independent dimensions of successful job performance. Additionally, the analysis
process defines the categories of types of knowledge required for task performance, i.e.,
the job knowledge domain. Next, the identified task elements are rated as to their
importance and frequency of use in the job. This process of rating possible test items
may be completed by the same group who generated the original list or by another group
of job incumbents/supervisors. Those items that meet pre-established criteria are
included in the written test.
Job incumbents help to develop and design job knowledge tests. These
incumbents, however, have already achieved some level of expertise within the task
domain and the job knowledge domain. Incumbents identify the job knowledge required
for task completion based upon their own levels of experience and understanding.
Possible benefits of the existing content-oriented approach to test design. The
obvious benefit to existing industrial/organizational approaches to test design is that they
provide a method for assessing declarative and procedural knowledge. Both of these
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knowledge types have been related to task performance. Thus, the existing approach
offers a good beginning in our attempts to predict that performance.
Possible limitations of existing content-oriented approaches to test design.
Again, these test development methods usually involve the identification and rating of
appropriate test items by subject matter experts who have ample experience on the job.
However, learning is viewed as an iterative process of knowledge acquisition,
understanding, and refinement (Anderson et al, 1981). Increased experience would
afford an individual more opportunities to acquire more task-relevant information. This,
in turn, would add to existing task knowledge and allow for increased understanding of
the task and refinement of the knowledge about successful task completion. Therefore,
standard industrial/organizational test design methods may not adequately assess the
amount and types of knowledge that is acquired at different stages of the learning
process.
Further, Landy and Vasey (1991) found that task frequency ratings were
significantly influenced by incumbent's level of experience. Thus, the content-oriented
tests developed by these individuals may reflect the task requirements as understood by
individuals with similar levels of experience. More specifically, the tests include
declarative items such as rules and facts that are necessary for task completion and
procedural information that identify how to complete task processes but may not include
items that assess the concepts, understood by incumbents, which inform the individual
about how to use that declarative and procedural task knowledge to successfully perform
the task. This information is excluded from domain definitions as identified by job
incumbents. Therefore, the defined task and knowledge domains may omit necessary
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content information and may omit methods for representing and assessing the qualitative
information about knowledge organization and use (Dubois & Shalin, 1995).
Additionally, content-oriented written tests may not provide the context to
facilitate the identification of the task performance features that discriminate between
levels of competence. Levels of task competence may reflect individual levels of task
knowledge. For example, novices must necessarily have less task knowledge than
incumbents (who help design the job knowledge tests) and therefore would perform at
lower levels than those with more task expertise. Although test items are rated for
importance and salience for the job, these items may be limited for identifying and
sampling the diagnostic job knowledge (Dubois & Shalin, 1995). That is, items rated for
importance and salience are not necessarily items that distinguish among levels of
expertise.
Cognitively-oriented approach. As discussed earlier, evidence from the cognitive
literature demonstrates that job knowledge includes more than declarative and procedural
task information. That is, individuals must know also how to apply those types of
knowledge to successfully perform the task. Procedural knowledge fails to supply this
application information because it is limited to knowledge of how to complete those
actions that are required within the task. Thus, procedural knowledge fails to address
abstract processes that determine when and why to perform those task-specific actions.
Cognitive research has shown that other knowledge is required that will allow the
individual to apply the givens of the task. Therefore, I am suggesting that as researchers
we should expand our conceptualization of job knowledge to include other components
of knowledge, the combination of which comprises task “understanding”. The
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development of an alternative definition of job knowledge will enable an alternative to
existing types of job knowledge tests.
Cognitive test-design methods. An alternative method for approaching test design
has been described that uses observations of job expertise as a guide for analyzing the
task. This cognitively-oriented approach emphasizes the description of job expertise and
analysis of how experts perform tasks within the context of the job. One purpose of this
type of approach is to identify more abstract procedures that are needed to accomplish
task goals, abstract information that is omitted in the industrial/organizational approach.
Additionally, the cognitively-oriented approach is designed to identify unique types of
information, including abstract cognitive process information, which is used to guide
successful execution of the task. (Dubois & Shalin, 1995; Dubois, Shalin, Levi, &
Borman, 1997). That is, a cognitively-oriented approach is aimed at capturing the more
abstract information, understood by more expert individuals, about the use of declarative
and procedural task information in successful task performance.
Dubois and Shalin's (1995) overall approach includes three stages of
implementation: knowledge elicitation, knowledge representation, and test
specifications. Eliciting knowledge is accomplished through the use of verbal protocols
and coaching, asking leading, task-relevant questions. Knowledge is represented using a
plan-goal graph, a 'picture' that organizes task-relevant information at various levels of
abstraction. Test content is specified by sampling different components of knowledge
that are identified as necessary for successful task completion. These components are
translated into questions, which are included in the initial item pool. The final test
version is created through the (piloting) process of item administration, statistical
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evaluation, and refinement. As in content-oriented test development, those items that
meet pre-established criteria are included in the written test.
Possible benefits of a cognitively-oriented test design. A cognitively-oriented
approach to designing job knowledge tests may offer a substantial amount of information
that is excluded from content-oriented tests. Tests that are content-oriented include rules
or facts that govern the task whereas cognitively-oriented tests include facets of
knowledge about processes that enable the individual to use those facts. The
identification of unique task process information would help to define task content more
completely.
Additionally, the cognitively-oriented approach allows us to identify and separate
systematically the more qualitative components of knowledge content, as well as the
declarative and procedural. Identification of these components of knowledge may be
crucial for explaining an individual's ability to understand how to perform the task. This
understanding increases as more details of the task are learned through experience.
Therefore, identification of these knowledge components may be beneficial in
discriminating the amount of task learning that has occurred. Further, I suggest that it is
the combination of these other components of knowledge, along with declarative and
procedural knowledge that the industrial/organizational content-oriented approach
uncovers, that can be identified as task "understanding", and that this understanding is a
more effective measure of job knowledge than content knowledge, and thus a better
predictor of performance. All of these components of knowledge are identified in the
cognitively-oriented approach to test design.
Furthermore, a cognitively-oriented approach provides a method for representing
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task knowledge. This representation allows the researcher to determine the aspects of
knowledge that are important for inclusion in the task description. This offers the
opportunity to include substantial information about task understanding that is omitted in
the content-oriented approach.
Finally, a cognitively-oriented approach provides a method for incorporating
these task knowledge variables to be included in the job-knowledge test. If the ultimate
goal of job knowledge tests is to determine an individual's ability to perform a task, then
these tests should identify the processes that are understood about how to implement the
givens of a task in order to achieve successful performance. This requires the
identification of knowledge, including but going beyond the declarative and procedural
information included in content-oriented tests. The resulting cognitively-oriented test
may be a better tool for assessing task knowledge than the content-oriented test because
the cognitively-oriented test focuses on task understanding in addition to task rules,
factual, and procedural information. Thus, the inclusion of ‘other’ knowledge items may
result in a better idea of actual task performance, and therefore, may help the researcher
to better understand the relationship between task knowledge and successful task
performance. Therefore, in the current study, a measure of task understanding was
developed using a cognitively-oriented approach.
Summary of approaches to test-design.
In summary, existing industrial/organizational methods for job knowledge test
design use a content-oriented approach. The resulting job knowledge tests identify
declarative and procedural knowledge that is applicable to the task at hand. However,
these tests do not include items that assess an individual's level of task understanding.
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Thus, this design method may be inadequate for the measure of overall knowledge
because different types of knowledge are acquired at different stages in the learning
process. Alternatively, cognitively-oriented test design methods are aimed at addressing
the task understanding that the individual acquires during the learning process. This
understanding includes declarative knowledge, procedural knowledge, and appropriate
application knowledge. Thus, a cognitively-oriented approach may better address issues
of evaluating learning as a mechanism through which learning cognitive ability affects
performance.
Furthermore, these traditional industrial/organizational test design methods may
exclude information that may offer a better understanding of the relationship between the
level of existing or acquired knowledge and task performance. Therefore, it may be
beneficial to explore alternative methods for the development of knowledge tests that
assess different levels of learning and include additional information that is relevant for
task performance. The current study will use distinct measures to assess 1) the amount of
declarative and procedural knowledge that is acquired and 2) the individual's level of task
understanding.
Stereotype Threat
Definition of stereotype threat. One factor that has been proposed as contributing
to mean score differences between majority and minority group members is stereotype
threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995). Stereotype threat has been defined as the perception of
“being at risk of confirming, as self-characteristic, a negative stereotype about one’s
group” (Steele & Aronson, 1995, p. 797). More specifically, stereotype threat involves
membership in some subgroup (racial/ethnic/gender) and being aware of the existence of
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negative stereotypes associated with that subgroup. The threat comes from the perceived
risk of confirming those negative stereotypes by performing poorly. Steele and Aronson
(1995) proposed that stereotype threat interferes with the intellectual functioning of
students belonging to various minority subgroups, “particularly during standardized tests”
(p. 797), and that repeated experience with failure due to stereotype threat causes
minority group members to withdraw from academic pursuits. Thus, stereotype threat
has been discussed as a possible social-psychological mechanism that mediates
race/gender effects on academic performance.
The detrimental effects of stereotype threat. Farr (2003) described stereotype
threat as “the pressure individuals my feel when they are at risk of confirming, or being
seen by others as confirming” the negative stereotypes associated with one’s group (p.
179). The awareness of the group’s negative stereotype is believed to be threatening
enough to have disruptive effects on performance (Steele & Aronson, 1995). In an effort
to find evidence in support of this idea, Steele and Aronson (1995) conducted a series of
studies in which they attempted to activate stereotype threat and examine its effects.
Their findings demonstrated that stereotype threat affected both accuracy and
performance. More specifically, when the test was presented as diagnostic of ability,
black participants achieved lower proportions of questions correct over the number of
those attempted as well as achieving lower overall scores than whites. Finally, stereotype
threat has been shown to reduce the cognitive resources available to an individual
(Schmader & Johns, 2003).
However, stereotype threat is not limited to a black-white issue. Research has
extended the application to examine possible effects on other subgroups as well. This
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research has demonstrated that stereotype threat affects the individual performance of
other subgroups (e.g., women, Latinos) on advanced, challenging cognitive tests. More
specifically, research has demonstrated that stereotype threat impairs the performance of
women (i.e., McIntyre, Paulson, & Lord, 2003; Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel,
2006; Marx & Roman, 2002; Pinel, 1999) and of Latinos' (Schmader & Johns, 2003) on
advanced math tests.
Triggering stereotype threat. Additionally, Steele and Aronson (1995) examined
possible triggers of stereotype threat. They proposed, and were able to demonstrate, that
presenting a test as diagnostic of intellectual ability had this triggering effect on black
(but not white) participants. More specifically, when blacks believed that they were
taking a diagnostic test, they demonstrated more cognitive activation of black
stereotypes. Moreover, this diagnostic condition caused blacks to generate more selfdoubt about their ability than others and to avoid identification with stereotypically black
preferences and traits (e.g., rap music, basketball, lazy, aggressive). Blacks were more
reluctant to have their race linked to their performance, as evidenced by the finding that
when stereotype threat was activated, and when given the option, 75% of black
participants did not identify their race on a demographics questionnaire. Steele and
Aronson (1995) argued that it may be simply the act of making race salient that is enough
to trigger stereotype threat.
Mediators of stereotype threat effects on performance. Steele and Aronson
(1995) proposed that stereotype threat would produce increased anxiety, that
“apprehension over possibly conforming to the negative group stereotype” (p. 801) could
mediate stereotype threat effects on performance. Although these authors found no
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significant black-white subgroup differences in their study, more recently, Osborne
(2001) found significant differences in anxiety between whites and African Americans,
Latinos, and Native Americans (ALANAS) and that anxiety partially mediated race
effects on academic performance and gender effects on math performance, thus providing
some general support for the hypothesis. Further, Schmader and Johns (2003) found that
stereotype threat affects the math performance of women and Latinos through its effects
on working memory capacity. More specifically, these authors found that stereotype
threat reduces the working memory capacity of members of these two subgroups and that
this reduction produced lower test scores when compared to men and whites,
respectively.
Moderators of stereotype threat effects. However, the effects of stereotype threat
may depend on the individual’s level of domain identification, or the degree to which the
individual cares about and identifies with the skills being tested (Steele & Aronson,
1995). More specifically, domain identification requires that the individual views the
possession of these skills as being tied to his/own sense of self-regard (Steele & Aronson,
1995). This idea has received mixed support in the existing literature. For example,
McFarland, Lev-Arey, and Ziegert (2003) found that overall, individuals who reported
higher levels of domain identification achieved higher scores on cognitive ability tests
than those with lower levels of domain identification. However, these authors found also
an interaction between race and domain identification such that this effect existed for
white participants but there was no relationship between domain identification and test
performance for blacks.
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Another mechanism that has been discussed as affecting the relationship between
stereotype threat and performance is “stigma consciousness” (Pinel, 1999). Stigma
consciousness (SC) has been defined as an individual difference that “concerns the extent
to which individuals are chronically self-conscious of their stigmatized status”. More
specifically, stigma consciousness requires not only that the individual care about the
skills being tested and view those skills as a pert of his/her ‘self” but that he/she focus on
the stigma related to his/her group’s stereotype regarding that skill. Thus, stigma
consciousness has been identified also as a moderator in the stereotype threat performance relationship.
To investigate this moderation, using the math test from a practice GRE, Brown
and Pinel (2003) demonstrated that individual differences in stigma consciousness
moderated gender stereotype effects on math performance of women, such that the results
revealed a stronger detrimental effect of stereotypes on performance for women high in
stigma consciousness and a weaker relationship between gender stereotypes and
performance for women low in stigma consciousness. Furthermore, in the low threat
testing condition, stigma consciousness was unrelated to test performance.
Furthermore, some researchers have begun to examine methods to alleviate the
effects of stereotype threat by identifying other variables that may act to reduce the
effects of test perceptions. For example, Marx and Roman (2002) found that exposure to
interaction with, or knowledge about a competent female role model acted as a buffer to
poor test performance and to perceptions of math ability. Along similar lines, McIntyre,
Paulson, and Lord (2003) found that reminding (threatened) women of the abilities or
achievements of other women alleviated differences in math test performance relative to
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that of men. Most recently, Martens, Johns, Greenberg, and Schimel (2006) found that
when [stereotype-threatened] women used self-affirmation before taking a math test, they
achieved scores that were similar to non-threatened women as well as men. Finally,
Aronson, Fried, and Good (2002) found that when they were able to induce students to
view intelligence as malleable, both African American and white students obtained
higher grade point averages, while reporting greater engagement in and enjoyment of the
academic process than students in control groups.
In sum, stereotype threat results from the individual's perception of or reactions to
the test. According to the theory of stereotype threat, it is these perceptions that seem to
result in poorer performance for members of the stereotyped group(s). Therefore, much
of the existing research has focused on those perceptions in order to alter stereotype
threat effects.
Finally, as noted by Farr (2003), much of the existing evidence in support of
stereotype effects on cognitive ability tests is based on manipulations designed to induce
specific perceptions of the tests. That is, researchers have used manipulations to either
induce stereotype threat or not and then have compared test score performance in these
conditions. More specifically, researchers have presented the tests as either diagnostic of
intellectual ability or simply as tasks included in studies designed to investigate problemsolving (Farr, 2003).
However, consistent with theory (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Steele, 1997), the
stereotype threat effect(s) should occur “naturally” when any test is perceived as
diagnostic of intellectual ability as in the case of standard cognitive ability tests. This
idea has support in the existing research. For example, in the African American control
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group used by Aronson, Fried, and Good (2002), when not instructed to view intelligence
as malleable, students achieved lower GPAs than those in the experimental group who
did receive the instructions.
Furthermore, this effect should occur in any setting where there is some
consequence attached to test performance, as in a real-world selection situation. This
idea has received support in existing literature also. For example, although in an
experimental setting, McFarland, Lev-Arey, and Ziegert (2003) found that threat
influenced test scores when those scores were linked to a monetary reward. Thus,
consistent with previous research, I expected to find that a cognitive ability test will
produce significant black-white mean score differences.
Proposed Research
To examine possible causes of black-white test score differences, two separate
studies were performed. Study One was designed to focus on the examination of specific
assumptions inherent in the literature on stereotype threat effects. Specifically, the first
study focused on the measure of test perceptions and their effects on test and task
performance. However, this first study did not address directly the effects of perceived
stereotype threat relative to the tests. Therefore, a second study was designed to assess
perceived stereotype threat directly and to examine the effects of stereotype threat
perceptions on test scores.
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Study 1
According to the stereotype threat literature (discussed above), it may be the
individual’s perceptions of the test that creates these significant black-white mean score
differences. Specifically, the assumption is that blacks perceive specific tests as
threatening and therefore perform poorly on these tests compared to whites. If this
assumption is accurate, then for blacks, perceiving a test as assessing one’s intelligence
may be at the root of black-white test score differences. Further, it seems plausible that if
even educated psychologists view cognitive ability as intelligence, and intelligence as a
stable characteristic, then laymen may have the same view also. Thus, a test that
measures cognitive ability should be perceived as measuring intelligence and should,
therefore, cause black-white differences in scores.
However, job knowledge tests should not be perceived as evaluative of
intelligence or ability because knowledge (as discussed earlier also) should be perceived
as malleable rather than stable, and thus should evoke no such threat. This idea is
supported in the existing research involving the induction of stereotype threat wherein
instructions distinguished between tests presented as diagnostic of intelligence and those
presented as simple tools (tasks) used for other purposes. Moreover, I expected that
individuals would be able to distinguish between tests of cognitive ability and tests of
task-specific knowledge. Whereas the cognitive ability tests should be perceived as
diagnostic of intelligence, the task knowledge tests should not. Rather, job knowledge
tests should be perceived simply as tests of job knowledge, a malleable construct.
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Therefore, black-white mean differences on the knowledge tests should be smaller than
those produced on cognitive ability tests
H1a:

Blacks and whites will have different mean scores on a cognitive ability test.

H1b:

A basic job knowledge test will produce significantly smaller black-white mean
score differences than a cognitive ability test.

H1c:

An understanding knowledge test will produce significantly smaller black-white
mean score differences than a cognitive ability test.
Furthermore, I expected to replicate previous findings that knowledge predicts

performance better than cognitive ability (Palumbo, 2004). Thus, I expected that both
knowledge tests would predict performance better than cognitive ability. Moreover, as
discussed earlier, the different techniques used to design each knowledge test produce
measures addressing different information. More specifically, I suggested that
understanding test would be a better measure of knowledge because of the quality of the
information captured within the test, relative to the basic knowledge test. Therefore,
understanding will be a better predictor of performance than either cognitive ability or
basic knowledge.
H2a:

Basic knowledge will account for more of the variance in performance than
cognitive ability.

H2b:

Understanding will account for more of the variance in performance than
cognitive ability.

H2c:

Understanding will account for more of the variance in performance than basic
knowledge.
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Finally, I expected to replicate previous findings that job knowledge mediates the
effects of cognitive ability on performance (Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). However, if, as
suggested by Palumbo (2004), the strength of this mediation depends on how knowledge
is measured, then the specific test used to examine mediation will affect the results. That
is, a better test of knowledge will produce stronger mediating effects. Therefore, I expect
that, whereas basic knowledge will partially mediate the relationship between cognitive
ability and performance, understanding will completely mediate this relationship
(Palumbo et al, 2005).
H3a:

Basic knowledge will partially mediate the effects of cognitive ability on
performance.

H3b:

Understanding will completely mediate the effects of cognitive ability on
performance.

Test Bias and Test Fairness.
The finding that one test accounts for more variance in performance than another
is not sufficient to determine that it is a “better” predictor. One must consider also the
possibility of test bias. According to Guion (2000), “Bias refers to systematic group
differences in item responses, test scores, or other assessments for reasons unrelated to
the trait being assessed…” (p. 433). Further, Cascio (1998) refers to the possibility of
bias in selection as a “central issue in any discussion of EEO.” (p. 121). Therefore, I
have included a brief discussion of some of the existing literature regarding test bias and
test fairness.
First, we should distinguish between test bias, discrimination, and test fairness.
Bias is a technical issue, one that Guion (2000) describes as “a distortion in statistics or
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measurement” (p. 433). Bias can be either positive or negative and is an artifact of the
selection test itself. Discrimination is simply the act of making distinctions. It is the
purpose behind the administration of selection measures. A valid selection measure is
one that can discriminate accurately between high and low performers. Thus, a valid
selection test is a test that “accurately discriminates between those with high and those
with low probabilities of success on the job” (Cascio, 1998, p. 122). The issue is whether
or not the test discriminates “unfairly.” Test fairness and/or unfairness relates to (legally)
unfair discrimination, i.e., the unequal probability of subgroup members being hired
regardless of equal probability of success on the job.
The Cleary (1968) model of test fairness, also known as the regression model
(Guion, 2000), discusses bias in terms of the intercept, individual regression lines, and
average regression line for the two subgroups. According to this model, at test is biased
if the common regression line for the two groups consistently over-predicts or underpredicts the criterion scores for members of the two subgroups. More specifically,
according to this model, if the intercept for the minority group is below that of the
majority group, then the common regression line would always over-predict the
performance of the minority group. In this case the test would be considered “positively”
biased in favor of the minority subgroup. However, if the intercept for the minority
group is above that of the majority group, then the average regression line (and ultimately
the test) would consistently under-predict the performance of the minority group. In this
case, the test would be considered as negatively biased against the minority subgroup.
Thus, according to the Cleary (1968) model, a test is biased if the common regression
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line predicts nonzero differences in performance for the two groups. This means that a
test is fair only if the regression lines are the same for each subgroup.
The Thorndike (1971) model of test fairness argues that a test is fair if the
percentage of minorities selected is equal to the percentage that would be hired based on
criterion scores. This requires that the score differences on the test equal the score
differences in performance. However, unless there are no subgroup differences in the
criterion, this model requires the regression line of the majority group to lie above the
regression line for the minority. Given that subgroup differences in performance exist,
the Thorndike (1971) model requires that the test over-predict performance for members
of the minority subgroup (Hunter, Schmidt, & Hunter, 1977). Thus, in terms of test bias,
as discussed above, the Thorndike (1971) model requires the test to be biased in favor of
the minority.
However, as discussed in the literature, test bias does not necessarily imply test
unfairness. Whereas test bias is a measurement issue, test unfairness (or fairness) is
discussed as a societal, political, and legal one (Cascio, 1998; Guion, 2000). Both have
implications for unfair selection decisions (i.e., adverse impact) and therefore must be
included in this discussion.
The topic of fairness of tests has been an ongoing discussion in the literature,
including the distinction between bias and fairness. Specifically, the one approach to
determining test fairness that is most widely accepted is consistent with the Cleary model
(Guion, 2000). That is, a test may be considered fair as long as it does not exhibit bias
against the minority subgroup. This idea is especially apparent in much of the literature
discussing the “fairness” of cognitive ability tests, as evidenced by statements such as
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“The general acceptance of the Cleary (1968) model…” and “acceptance of the Cleary
model as ‘superior’…” (Chung-Yan & Cronshaw, 2002). Further, according to Schmidt
and Hunter (1982) “cognitive tests are fair to minority group members (specifically
blacks and hispanics) under this model of test fairness.” (pp. 601 – 602). Thus, it seems
to be the consensus that, if a test exhibits bias, that test is considered fair if long as it is
biased in favor of the minority.
Finally, both of the models of test bias/fairness discussed above assumed that the
regression lines for the two population subgroups are parallel. However, it may be
possible that this is not the case. That is, the slopes of the regression lines may differ
significantly. This raises the issue of the possibility of differential validity, i.e., the
possibility that a test predicts differentially for the two subgroups. However, previous
research has demonstrated that, if the slopes of the regression lines do differ for the two
population subgroups, that difference is caused by chance or by statistical artifacts
(Hunter, Schmidt, & Hunter, 1979). A test is considered unfair if it predicts performance
differently (significantly) for each of the subgroups for which it is administered.
Differential prediction can be demonstrated by a finding of a significant effect of the
interaction of subgroup membership (in this case, race) and test score on task
performance.
In sum, as demonstrated by the discussion above, test bias/fairness is an important
issue in selection testing. Thus it is a research question that must be addressed when
examining the effectiveness of any new test. Therefore, in the current study, I examined
the research question that addresses the possibility of bias and the issue of fairness
associated with each of the knowledge tests, as well as the cognitive ability test.
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Research Q1: Is the cognitive ability test, the basic knowledge test, and/or the
understanding test biased against any subgroup compared to the other subgroup?
Method
Participants
Participants (N = 320) were students at a medium-sized mid-western university
with an open-enrollment policy. All students participated in exchange for extra credit
points. Of these students, I obtained 145 (45%) from a pool of undergraduate students
enrolled in introductory psychology classes. However, this student pool did not include
an adequate number of African Americans to meet the study requirements. Therefore, I
recruited the remaining 55% of the participants from outside of the subject pool. Thus,
96 (30%) of the participants were recruited from advanced psychology classes and 81
(25%) from courses other than psychology. Table 1 shows the breakdown of participants
recruited from specific courses.

Table 1
Breakdown of Participants by Course Type
Number of
Students
145
96
6
6
18
34
15
320

Course Type

Introductory Psychology
Advanced Psychology
Anthropology
Applied Behavioral Science
Regional Studies
Sociology
Women’s Studies
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Furthermore, this sample included students from a wide range of university majors.
Table 2 lists the breakdown of participants by college major.

Table 2
Breakdown of Participants by College Major
College Major
Applied Behavioral Science
Biology
Bio-Medical Engineering
Business
Communications
Computer Science
Criminal Justice
Dance
Education
Engineering
Exercise Biology
History
Mass Communications
Music Education
Organizational Leadership
Psychology
Social Work
Sociology
Nursing
Urban Affairs
Undecided
Other

Number of Participants
5
2
1
22
7
2
3
1
19
6
2
1
1
1
1
118
1
10
11
1
2
103
320

Thus, the final sample consisted of 320 students, ranging in age from 17 to 53 years. Of
these, 123 were African Americans (19 males, 104 females); 179 were White Americans
(64 males, 115 females), 4 were Asian Americans (1 male, 3 females), 9 were Hispanic
Americans (4 males, 5 females), and 5 listed their race as "Other" (2 males, 3 females).
Task Description
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Participants performed an adaptation of an existing computer-based truck
dispatching simulation task (Steele-Johnson & Perlow, 1989). This task required
participants to receive, process, and ship orders of military parts and supplies to various
areas within an Area of Responsibility (A.O.R.). Eight rules constrained the processing
of these orders. Rules included information about identifying order types, order delivery
schedules, truck capacity restrictions, and delivery area restrictions. Running task time
was identified as the time spanning one working week. That is, the task time began at
9:00 a.m. on Monday and ended at 5:00 p.m. Friday. Each hour interval in the task was
equivalent to 15 seconds in real time. Each day in the task corresponded to two minutes
in real time. Each task trial lasted 10 minutes. All participants received task instructions
prior to attempting the task.
Test Types
A primary purpose of the current study was to examine the effects of three types
of tests on perceptions and performance: tests of cognitive ability, basic knowledge, and
understanding.
Cognitive ability. I assessed cognitive ability using the Wonderlic Personnel Test
(Wonderlic, C., 2002). The measure is a 12-minute, speeded test, with a total of 50
items. This measure assesses verbal, mathematical, and analytical ability. I calculated
the test score as the sum of correct responses. The reported test-retest reliability of this
measure ranges from .82 to .94.
Basic knowledge. I assessed basic knowledge using a measure designed for this
study (see Appendix A). I selected the items included in the current test from an item
bank that was developed for use in the author’s master’s thesis. That basic knowledge
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test employed existing industrial/organizational test-development procedures (see
Palumbo, 2004, for a discussion of test design methods). I designed the test to measure
an individual's knowledge of the declarative information (i.e., rules) and procedural
information (i.e., keystroke use) that governs the task. I used a multiple-choice
framework with four response options for this 30-item, paper-and-pencil measure and
calculated the test score as the sum of the correct responses. Sample questions: "What is
accomplished by pressing CNTRL-P?" [Answer: "You can ship the pickup order(s)."]
and "What key or keys allow you to ship a pickup order?" (Answer: "CNTRL-P.")
These questions assessed only declarative and procedural task information. The internal
reliability coefficient for this test in this study was .84.
Understanding. I assessed understanding using a paper-and-pencil measure
designed for this study (see Appendix B). I selected the items included in the current test
from an item bank that was developed for the author’s master’s thesis (See Palumbo,
2004, for a discussion of test design methods). That understanding test employed a
cognitively-oriented approach to test development. I designed the test to measure the
qualitative components of an individual's overall knowledge and understanding of task
requirements, procedures, and their appropriate applications for successful task
completion. I used a multiple-choice framework with five response options for this 30item, paper-and-pencil measure and calculated the test score as the sum of the correct
responses. Sample questions: "If you attempt to ship a truck that is overloaded by 5
units:" (Answer: "The truck will go out, and a penalty is assessed.") and "If you attempt
to ship a truck that is loaded with 42 or more items:" (Answer: "The truck will not go
out, and a penalty is assessed."). These sample questions required the individual to
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understand that there was a predetermined maximum truck capacity, that they had
exceeded truck capacity by a specific amount, and that consequences existed for
attempting to ship that specific truck. The internal reliability coefficient for this test in
this study was .80.
Test Order
To examine the possibility that exposure to one knowledge test influences
perceptions of and performance on the next, I implemented two test order conditions.
More specifically, it may be the case that individuals’ perceptions of an initial test might
influence their perceptions of a second test. Additionally, it may be the case that
individuals acquire knowledge (learn) from the information included in the first test,
beyond their level of task-related information acquired during the task. This additional
information, then, may enhance performance on the second knowledge test. Therefore, I
divided participants into two groups such that one half received the basic knowledge test,
followed by the understanding test; the second group received the knowledge tests in the
opposite order.
Measures
Test perceptions. I assessed test perceptions using a 13-item, paper-and-pencil
measure (see Appendix C), which was designed for this study to capture the individual’s
perceptions of three distinct constructs: 1) perceptions of the tests as measures of
intelligence and knowledge, 2) test-task relatedness (face validity), and 3) test-taking
motivation. Participants rated the degree to which they agreed with each question on a 7point Likert-type scale with 1 representing “Strongly Disagree” and 7 representing
“Strongly Agree”.
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I assessed perceptions of the tests as measures of intelligence and knowledge
using an adaptation of Steele and Aronson's (1995) manipulation check for stereotype
threat inductions. Their single-item measure began with an open-ended statement,
followed by three possible response options. Participants responded by choosing one of
the three possible options. The item in their original measure was: "The purpose of this
experiment was to: (a) provide a genuine test of my abilities in order to examine personal
factors involved in verbal ability; (2) provide a challenging test to examine factors
involved in solving verbal problems; (c) present you with unfamiliar verbal problems to
measure verbal learning." (Steele & Aronson, 1995, p. 800).
The measure I designed for this study included two questions (Subscale 1),
designed to assess the individual’s perceptions of each test as a measure of intelligence
and as a measure of job knowledge. The questions were: "1. I believe that the test I just
completed was designed to measure of my general intelligence.”; and “2. I believe that
the test I just completed was designed to measure my knowledge of a particular task.”
I assessed test relatedness perceptions using an adaptation of a 4-item scale
designed by Chan, Schmitt, Sacco, and DeShon, (1998). These authors designed the
items to assess the individual’s perception of the relatedness of the test to the job. In
Chan et al.’s study, participants responded on a 5-point, Likert-type scale with 1
representing “Strongly Disagree” and 5 Representing “Strongly Agree”. A sample item
from the test relatedness scale is: “I do not understand what the test had to do with this
job.” Thus, Subscale 2 of the test perceptions measure used in this study, Items 3 - 6,
consisted of Chan, Schmitt, Sacco, and DeShon’s (1998) test relatedness items. Chan et
al. (1998) reported a reliability coefficient of .74 for this scale. In the current study, the
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internal reliability coefficient was .75. These items were administered to enable the
possible examination of alternative explanations for the observed results.
I assessed test-taking motivation using a 7-item scale designed by Chan, Schmitt,
DeShon, Clause, and Delbridge, (1997). These authors designed the items to assess the
individual’s perception of their level of test-taking motivation. In Chan et al.’s study,
participants responded on a 5-point, Likert-type scale with 1 representing “Strongly
Disagree” and 5 Representing “Strongly Agree”. A sample item from the test-taking
motivation scale is: “Doing well on this test was important to me.” Thus, Subscale 3 of
the test perceptions measure used in this study, Items 7 - 13, consisted of Chan, Schmitt,
DeShon, Clause, and Delbridge, (1997) test-taking motivation items. Chan et al. (1998)
reported a reliability coefficient of .86 for this scale. In the current study, the internal
reliability coefficient was .91. These items were administered to enable the possible
examination of alternative explanations for the observed results.
Task performance. I operationalized task performance as participants’
performance scores on each trial, as calculated by the computer. Participants received 5
points for each unit of office equipment correctly shipped and lost 10 points for each rule
violation.
Demographics. I collected demographic information using a paper-and-pencil
measure designed for this study (see Appendix D). Demographic items included age,
race, gender, college ranking (freshman, sophomore, junior, senior), and college major.
General perceptions. I assessed general perceptions about the fixedness (or
malleability) of both intelligence and job knowledge using a paper-and-pencil measure
designed for this study. This measure included two questions: "1. I believe that my
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intelligence is a fixed, unchanging characteristic.”; “2. I believe that my knowledge
about a particular task can be changed.” Participants rated the degree to which they agree
with each question on a 7-point Likert-type scale with 1 representing “Strongly Disagree”
and 7 representing “Strongly Agree”.
Procedure
Participants were assigned to one of two test order conditions such that half of the
participants received the basic knowledge test, followed by the understanding test; the
second half received the knowledge tests in the opposite order. Figure 1 shows the order
of administration of experimental procedures for both testing conditions.

Condition One
Task
Instructions
& Practice
(2 Trials)

Basic
Knowl.
Test

Task
Perf.
(3 Trials)

Under.
Test
TP

TP

Cog.
Ability
Test

Demos
GP

TP

Condition Two
Task
Instructions
& Practice
(2 Trials)

Under.
Test
TP

Basic
Knowl.
Test

Task
Perf.
(3 Trials)

TP

Cog.
Ability
Test

Demos
TP

Figure 1. Model denoting order of administration of experimental procedures.
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GP

Each participant received task instructions and performed two 10-minute practice
trials (Trials 1 and 2). Next, participants completed the written measures of basic
knowledge and task understanding, with the order depending on condition. Immediately
following the first job knowledge test, participants completed the measure of test
perceptions (TP) for that test. Then, participants completed the second job knowledge
test followed immediately by another measure of test perceptions (TP). Next,
participants completed three more 10-minute trials of the dispatching task (Trials 3, 4,
and 5). After completing the task trials, each participant completed the measure of
cognitive ability. Administering the cognitive ability test after the job knowledge tests
eliminated the possibility that any stereotype threat effect triggered by the cognitive
ability test would affect performance on the job knowledge tests. Next, participants
completed a test perceptions (TP) measure relative to the cognitive ability test. Finally,
participants completed the demographics questionnaire and the general perceptions (GP)
measure at the end of the experimental session. Note: Providing demographic
information only at the end of the session eliminated the possibility of making race
salient to the participants prior to their completion of knowledge or ability measures.
Results
Sample Characteristics
Participants (N = 320) were run in one of two conditions which differed only in
the order of administration of the two job knowledge tests. In Condition 1, the basic
knowledge test preceded the understanding test. In Condition 2 the test order was
reversed. Out of a possible 1600 task performance scores (320 participants X 5 scores
per person), a total of 37 (2.3%) missing values were observed. These missing task
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performance data were replaced by calculating a regression line for each individual and
estimating the missing value according to the regression. In sum, a total of 13 (0.8%)
scores were estimated for performance on the two practice trials (8 scores for T-1; 5 for
T-2). Additionally, 24 (1.5%) scores were estimated for performance on the three task
trials following knowledge test administration: 10, 5, and 9 scores for Trials 3, 4 and 5,
respectively.
Further, the data were examined for the presence of possible outliers and/or
response bias. Using a criterion cutoff of five (5) standard deviations (SD) from the
mean for performance on all tests and the dispatching task, no outlying values were
observed. All values fell within three (3) SDs of the mean value. Therefore, all
individual data were available for use in the analyses.
In order to be compare even numbers of African American participants to Whites,
the sample had to be reduced. I accomplished this reduction by removing, initially, all
(18) participants who listed their race as “Asian American” (4 participants), “Hispanic
American” (9 participants), or “Other” (5 participants). Then, using a random number
generator, I selected participants to remove on the basis of race. Of the resulting sample
(n = 246), 104 African Americans were female, 19 were male; 62 Whites were female, 61
were male. This sample was used in all analyses.
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations between Study Variables
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations between Study 1 variables are
shown in Table 3.
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Table 3
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Study Variables
Variable

Mean

SD

1 Race
--------2 TPCAT1
5.99
1.51
3 TPCAT2
3.11
2.08
4 TPBas1
3.33
1.88
5 TPBas2
5.28
1.79
6 TPUnd1
3.35
1.93
7 TPUnd2
5.35
1.71
8 GenPerc1
2.30
1.58
9 GenPerc2
6.46
1.00
10 WonTot
21.34
5.87
11 BasTot
18.84
5.77
12 UndTot
13.18
5.39
13 PerfT3
648.84 819.41
14 PerfT4
994.92 898.33
15 PerfT5
1210.07 893.50
16 PerfAvg
951.27 817.04

1
-.10
-.19**
-.19**
-.01
-.19**
-.06
-.07
.15*
.48†
.34†
.42†
.35†
.39†
.37†
.39†

2

3

4

5

--.05
.24***
.21***
.23***
.29†
-.14*
.17**
.10
.11
.12
.07
.07
.02
.05

-.36†
-.14*
.37†
-.04
.09
-.16*
-.32†
-.26†
-.29†
-.14*
-.12
-.12
-.13*

-.07
.73†
.12
.12
-.12
-.29†
-.10
-.13*
-.11
-.06
-.06
-.08

6

-.08
-.55† .11
-.04 .02
.19** -.09
.00 -.29†
.20** -.03
.11 -.06
.04 .01
.06 .05
.07 .04
.06 .03

7

8

9

10

--.10
.20**
-.03
.11
.08
.00
.05
.01
.02

--.30†
-.06
-.11
-.13*
-.11
-.10
-.11
-.11

-.21***
.21***
.24***
.07
.08
.03
.06

-.54†
.58†
.37†
.35†
.29†
.36†

11

-.77†
.56†
.53†
.49†
.56†

12

13

14

-.59†
-.55† .81† -.50† .75† .89† -.58† .91† .96† .94†

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, † p < .0001.
Key:
TPCAT1
Perceptions that the Cognitive Ability Test (CAT) is a measure of general intelligence
TPCAT2
Perceptions that the Cognitive Ability Test (CAT) is a measure of job/task knowledge
TPBas1
Perceptions that the Basic Knowledge Test is a measure of general intelligence
TPBas2
Perceptions that the Basic Knowledge Test is a measure of job/task knowledge
TPUnd1
Perceptions that the Understanding Test is a measure of general intelligence
TPUnd2
Perceptions that the Understanding Test is a measure of job/task knowledge
GenPerc1
Perceptions of Intelligence as fixed, unchangable
GenPerc2
Perceptions of Job Knowledge as Malleable
WonTot
Total Score on the Wonderlic Cognitive Ability Test
BasTot
Total Score on the Basic (Job Knowledge) Test
UndTot
Total Score on the Understanding (Job Knowledge) Test
PerfT3 - PerfT5 refers to Task Performance in Trials 3 through 5

Initial Group Differences
To check for initial group differences, I compared the means for the variables
within each condition (i.e., Test Order). As stated earlier, in both groups, 50% of the
participants were African American and 50% were White. In both test order groups,
67.5% were female and 32.5% were male. Also, the breakdown for each race and gender
were similarly dispersed across both testing conditions [Condition 1: 30 white males, 30
white females, 9 black males, 51 black females; Condition 2: 31 white males, 32 white
females, 10 black males, 53 black females]. Further, although the age ranges for the two
groups differed slightly (i,e., participants in Test Order 1 ranged in age from 18 to 53 and
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15

16

--

from 17 to 45 in Test Order 2), the median age within each condition was 19.5 years and
the mean age was 22 years. Further, the cognitive ability scores ranged from 10 to 36 in
Condition 1 [M = 21.10, SD = 5.59] and from 7 to 35 in Condition 2 [M = 21.57, SD =
6.13]. Results indicated no significant difference in cognitive ability in the two
conditions [F(1, 245) = 0.40, p = .52]. Therefore, I concluded that minimal differences
existed between the two groups and that race, gender, and cognitive ability were evenly
distributed across both test order conditions.
Effects of Test Order
First, I examined the effects of test order on perceptions and performance to
determine whether test order influenced perceptions of tests as measures of intelligence
and knowledge, performance on the three tests, or performance on the task.
Effects of condition (test order) on perceptions of tests as measures of intelligence
and knowledge. To examine whether test order influenced perceptions of tests as
measures of intelligence and knowledge, I performed two anovas with test type as the
within subject factor. Specifically, I examined the effect of test order on the perception
of the test as a measure of intelligence for the two knowledge tests. Results demonstrated
a significant effect for condition with participants reporting stronger perceptions of the
tests as measuring intelligence when the basic knowledge test was administered first
[F(1, 244) = 8.99, p = .003]. Then I examined the effect of test order on the perception of
the test as a measure of knowledge for the two tests. Resulted indicated a significant
Condition X Test Type interaction effect [Wilks’ Lambda = .95, F(1, 244) = 12.60, p =
.0005]. Participants reported a stronger perception of the basic knowledge as a measure
of knowledge when the understanding test was administered first [F(1, 244) = 12.72, p =
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.0004], but test order had no effect on perceptions of the understanding test as a measure
of knowledge [F(1, 244) = 1.34, p = .25]. This effect did not play a role in tests of
hypotheses and only had implications for exploratory analyses with perceptions as an
outcome variable.
Effects of condition (test order) on test performance. To examine whether test
order influenced performance on the two knowledge tests, I performed two anovas.
Specifically, I examined the possible existence of ‘learning from the test’ by examining
the effects of test order on test performance for each of the two knowledge tests. Results
demonstrated no significant effect for order of test administration on scores on the basic
knowledge test [F(1, 245) = 0.01, p = .92] or scores on the test of understanding [F(1,
245) = 0.71, p = .40].
Effects of condition (test order) on task performance. Further analyses
demonstrated that the order of knowledge test administration had no significant effect on
task performance in any of the post-test task performance trials: F(1, 245) = 0.01, p =
.91, F(1, 245) = 1.42, p = .23, and F(1, 245) = 1.84, p = .18, for Task Trials 3 - 5,
respectively. Therefore, the order of test administration was excluded from tests of
hypotheses.
Effects of test type on perceptions. To examine whether test type (cognitive
ability, basic knowledge, understanding) was effective in inducing perceptions of tests as
measures of intelligence and knowledge, I performed a repeated measures anova with test
type as the within subject factor. I conducted the analysis twice, once for the perception
of the test as a measure of intelligence and once for the perception of the test as a
measure of knowledge. Results indicated a significant effect for test type on perceptions
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of the test as a measure of intelligence [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.36, F(2, 244) = 211.12, p <
.0001]. Additionally, results indicated a significant effect for test type on perceptions of
the test as a measures of (job) knowledge [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.59, F(2, 244) = 82.44, p <
.0001].
Further, I tested contrasts for each perception item, comparing perceptions
associated with the ability test versus perceptions associated with the basic knowledge or
understanding tests. Results indicated a significant difference in the perceptions of the
tests as measures of intelligence [F(2, 490) = 312.05, p < .0001]. To examine these
effects further, I contrasted the perceptions of the cognitive ability test with each of the
job knowledge tests. Specifically, I calculated the means for perceptions for the three
tests. Then, using t-tests (two-tailed), I compared the means for each of the two
knowledge test against the mean of the cognitive ability test, and against each other. This
procedure was completed twice–once for comparing the perceptions of the tests as
measures of intelligence and again for comparison of perceptions of the tests as measures
of knowledge. Although these tests were nonorthogonal, they provided me with a more
complete description of my data.
When the cognitive ability test was compared with the basic knowledge test,
results indicated a significant difference in test perceptions. When the cognitive ability
test was compared with the understanding test, results indicated a significant difference in
test perceptions. Both knowledge tests were perceived as different from the cognitive
ability test, such that participants reported a mean of 5.99 [SD = 1.51] for perceptions that
the cognitive ability test measured intelligence as compared to a mean of 3.33 [SD = 1.88,
t(245) = 19.68] and a mean of 3.35 [SD = 1.92, t(245) = 19.23], respectively, for the basic
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knowledge test and the test of understanding, both ps < .0001. Thus, the cognitive ability
test was perceived more strongly as a measure of intelligence than either of the job
knowledge tests. Furthermore, the contrast between each of the two knowledge tests
yielded no significant difference [t(245) = -0.27, p =.78]. Thus both knowledge tests
were perceived as significantly different from the cognitive ability test but not
significantly different from each other.
Also, results indicated a significant difference in the perceptions of the tests as
measures of knowledge [F(2, 490) = 125.92, p < .0001]. To examine these effects
further, I contrasted the perceptions of the cognitive ability test with each of the job
knowledge tests. Specifically, using t-tests (two-tailed), I compared the mean for
perceptions of the cognitive ability tests as a measure of knowledge against the means of
perceptions of each of the two knowledge tests as measures of knowledge.
When the cognitive ability test was compared with the basic knowledge test,
results indicated a significant difference in test perceptions. When the cognitive ability
test was compared with the understanding test, results indicated a significant difference in
test perceptions. That is, results indicated a significant difference in the way that the
cognitive ability test was viewed relative to both knowledge tests [t(245) = -11.59 and 12.74, respectively, for the basic knowledge test and the test of understanding, both ps <
.0001]. The reported means for perceptions of the three tests as measures of knowledge
were M = 3.11, SD = 2.08; M = 5.28, SD = 1.79; and M = 5.35, SD = 1.71; respectively,
for perceptions of the cognitive ability test, the basic knowledge test, and the
understanding test as a measure of knowledge. Thus, the two knowledge tests were
perceived more strongly as measures of knowledge than was the cognitive ability test.
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Finally, the contrast between each of the two knowledge tests yielded no significant
difference [t(245) = -0.27, p =.54]. Thus both knowledge tests were perceived as
significantly different from the cognitive ability test but not significantly different from
each other.
The Role of Race
An overarching theme developed in the introduction is that, for any given test,
race influences test perceptions, which in turn affect test performance (i.e., test scores),
which ultimately influences task performance. Researchers have discussed some of these
links conceptually (e.g., Steele & Aronson, 1995; Steele, 1997) and have provided
empirical evidence supporting other links (e.g., Schmidt & Hunter, 1998). In the current
study, I examined some of these links as stated hypotheses; however, I conducted
additional preliminary analyses examining other links in the conceptual model.
Specifically, I conducted preliminary analyses examining the effects of 1) race on test
perceptions, 2) race on general perceptions, 3) race on task performance, 4) test
perceptions on test performance, and 5) test perceptions on task performance.
Race effects on test perceptions. To examine the role of race on test perceptions, I
performed a series of anovas, with race as the predictor and test perceptions as the
outcome. Specifically, I examined the relationship between race and each test
perception, individually, relative to each test type. That is, I examined the relationship
between race and the perception of the test as measuring intelligence for each of the three
(cognitive ability, basic knowledge, and understanding) tests. Also, I examined the
relationship between race and the perception of the test as measuring knowledge for each
of the three tests.
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Results indicated no significant effect for race on the perception of the cognitive
ability test as a measure of intelligence [F(1, 244) = 2.31, p = 0.129]. Participants
reported similar perceptions [M = 5.85, SD = 1.67; M = 6.14, SD = 1.33, for Blacks and
Whites, respectively]. However, the effect of race on the perception of the cognitive
ability test as a measure of knowledge was significant [F(1, 244) = 8.92, p < .01]. A
comparison of means for the two groups demonstrated that Blacks perceived the
cognitive ability test as a measure of job/task knowledge more strongly than did Whites
[Blacks: M = 3.50, SD = 2.23; Whites: M = 2.72, SD = 1.85].
Additionally, results indicated a significant effect for race on the perception of the
basic knowledge test as a measure of intelligence [F(1, 244) = 8.94, p < .01]. A
comparison of means for the two groups demonstrated that Blacks perceived the basic
knowledge test as a measure of intelligence more strongly than did Whites [Blacks: M =
3.68, SD = 1.92; Whites: M = 2.98, SD = 1.79]. However, the effect of race on the
perception of the basic knowledge test as a measure of knowledge was not significant
[F(1, 244) = 0.01, p = .92; Blacks: M = 5.29, SD = 1.83; Whites: M = 5.27, SD = 1.75].
Finally, a pattern similar to that observed for the basic knowledge test emerged
for perceptions of the understanding test. Specifically, results indicated a significant
effect for race on the perception of the understanding test as a measure of intelligence
[F(1, 244) = 9.39, p < .01]. A comparison of means for the two groups demonstrated that
Blacks perceived the understanding test as a measure of intelligence more strongly than
did Whites [Blacks: M = 3.72, SD =1.99; Whites: M =2.98, SD = 1.79]. However, the
effect of race on the perception of the understanding test as a measure of knowledge was
not significant [F(1, 244) = 1.01, p = 0.32 [Blacks: M = 5.46, SD = 1.64; Whites: M =
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5.24, SD = 1.78]. Thus race had a significant effect in the perceptions associated with the
understanding test.
Race effects on general perceptions (beliefs) about intelligence and job
knowledge. To examine the role of race in general perceptions that intelligence is fixed
and/or that job knowledge is malleable, I performed anovas, with race as the predictor
and general perceptions as the outcome. Specifically, I assessed the effects of race on
each type of general perception (intelligence as fixed, knowledge as malleable). Results
indicated no significant effect of race on the perception that intelligence is fixed [F(1,
244) = 1.19, p = 0.28; [Blacks: M = 2.41, SD = 1.68; Whites: M = 2.19, SD = 1.46].
However, results indicated a significant effect of race on the perception (belief) that job
knowledge is malleable [F(1, 244) = 5.72, p < .05]. A comparison of means indicated
that Blacks perceived job knowledge as less malleable than did Whites [Blacks: M =
6.31, SD = 1.20; Whites: M = 6.60, SD = 0.72].
The effects of race on task performance. To examine the effects of race on task
performance, I performed anovas with repeated measures. Performance in the three posttest task trials (T3 – T5) was the within subject factor. Results indicated a significant
effect for Trial [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.85, F(2, 243) = 21.91, p < .0001]. Performance
improved across trials (M = 648.84, 994.92, and 1210.07 for Trials 3, 4, and 5,
respectively). Additionally, results indicated a significant effect for race [F(1, 244) =
45.01, p < .0001]. Blacks performed lower than Whites [Blacks’ average performance
across trials: 624.49, SD =735.32; Whites’ average performance: 1273.06, SD =
768.82]. There were no other significant effects.
The role of test perceptions in test performance. To examine the effects of test
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perceptions on test performance, I performed a series of regressions in which test
performance (test score) was regressed on each related perception (predictor).
Specifically, I regressed the score on the cognitive ability test on each perception relative
to that test. I repeated the procedure for each perception for each of the knowledge tests.
Results indicated no significant effect for perceptions of the cognitive ability test as a
measure of intelligence on the score on the cognitive ability test [F(1, 244) = 2.65, p =
0.105, β = 0.104]. However, results indicated a significant effect for perceptions of the
cognitive ability test as a measure of knowledge [F(1, 244) = 28.60, p < .0001, β = -0.32].
Thus, perceiving the cognitive ability as a measure of knowledge had a significant
detrimental effect on score on the cognitive ability test.
Next, I examined the effects of test perceptions on test score relative to the basic
knowledge test. First, I regressed test performance on the perception of the basic test as a
measure of intelligence. Results indicated no significant effect [F(1, 244) = 2.36, p =
0.13, β = -0.098]. Thus, perceiving the basic knowledge test as a measure of intelligence
had no significant effect on test score. However, results indicated a significant effect for
perceptions of the basic test was perceived as a measure of knowledge [F(1, 244) = 9.68,
p = 0.002, β = 0.195]. Thus, perceiving the basic test as measuring knowledge had a
significant, positive effect on test score.
Finally, I examined the effects of test perceptions on test score relative to the
understanding test. First, I regressed test performance on the perception of the
understanding test as a measure of intelligence. Results indicated no significant effect
[F(1, 244) = 0.82, p = 0.36, β = -0.058]. Further, results indicated no significant effect
for the perception of the understanding test as a measure of knowledge [F(1, 244) = 1.57,
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p = 0.21, β = 0.079]. Thus, neither perception relative to the test of understanding had a
significant on the understanding test score.
The role of test perceptions in task performance. To examine the effects of test
perceptions on task performance, I performed a series of repeated measures regressions
with task performance (score) in Trials 3 - 5 as the within subject factor. First, I
examined the effect of the perception of the test as a measure of intelligence on
performance for the cognitive ability test. Results indicated a significant effect for Trial
[Wilks’ Lambda = 0.91, F(2, 243) = 11.39, p < .0001]. Performance improved across
trials (M = 648.84, SD = 819.41; 994.92, SD = 898.33; and 1210.07, SD = 893.50 for
Trials 3, 4, and 5, respectively). There were no other significant effects for the
perception of the cognitive ability test as a measure of intelligence. Next, I examined the
effect of the perception of the test as a measure of knowledge on performance. Results
indicated a significant effect of trial [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.80, F(2, 243) = 30.68, p <
.0001]. These means are reported above. Further, results indicated a main effect for the
perception of the cognitive ability test as a measure of knowledge [F(1, 244) = 4.44, p <
.05, β = -0.134]. Thus, perceptions of the cognitive ability test as a measure of
knowledge had a detrimental effect on average task performance. There were no other
significant effects.
Next, task performance in Trials 3 - 5 was regressed on each perception for the
basic knowledge test. In examining the effect of the perception of the test as a measure of
intelligence, results indicated a significant effect for Trial [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.88, F(2,
243) = 20.26, p < .0001]. Performance improved across trials (M = 648.84, SD = 819.41;
994.92, SD = 898.33; and 1210.07, SD = 893.50 for Trials 3, 4, and 5, respectively).
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There were no other significant effects. Then I examined the effect of the perception of
the basic knowledge test as a measure of knowledge. Results indicated a significant
effect for Trial [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.94, F(2, 243) = 7.58, p < .001]. Performance
improved across trials (see means noted above). There were no other significant effects.
Finally, I regressed task performance in Trials 3 - 5 on each perception for the
understanding test. In examining the effect of the perception of the test as a measure of
intelligence, results indicated a significant effect for Trial [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.85, F(2,
243) = 21.50, p < .0001]. Performance improved across trials (M = 648.84, SD = 819.41;
994.92, SD = 898.33; and 1210.07, SD = 893.50 for Trials 3, 4, and 5, respectively).
There were no other significant effects. Then I examined the effect of the perception of
the understanding test as a measure of knowledge. Results indicated a significant effect
for Trial [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.92, F(2, 243) = 10.06, p < .001]. Performance improved
across trials (see means reported above). There were no other significant effects. Thus,
neither perception relative to the test of understanding had any significant on task
performance.
Size of Black-White Mean Differences in Scores on the Ability, Basic Knowledge, and
Understanding Tests (Hypothesis 1)
To examine the effects of test type on Black-White mean differences in test scores
(Hypotheses 1a, 1b, and 1c), I first computed the means for each test score within the
subgroups. Then, I computed t-tests comparing test scores for blacks versus whites on
each of the three tests. Finally, I examined whether the effect sizes observed for the three
t-tests are significantly different.
Specifically, to compare effect sizes I followed the approach suggested by
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Valentine and Cooper (2003). I assessed (a) the statistical significance of the effects, (b)
the practical significance based on raw mean differences, and (c) the relative size of the
effects based on standardized estimates of effect size. I accomplished (a) as described in
the preceding paragraph; (b) by reporting raw mean differences; and (c) by converting the
reported t values for the groups into standardized mean difference statistics, referred to as
d (Cohen, 1988), for direct comparison. Beyond practical interpretation, using Cohen’s
(1988) established benchmarks for effect size estimates (i.e., small if d = .20, medium if d
= .50, and large if d = .80), we can assert whether the effect size for race differences is
different in the three tests.
Size of Black-White mean differences on the cognitive ability test. The mean
scores on the cognitive ability tests were 18.54, (SD = 4.86) and 24.14, (SD = 5.44) for
Blacks and Whites, respectively. Thus, Blacks scored more than one SD lower than
Whites on the cognitive ability test, thereby providing support for Hypothesis 1a (H1a).
Results of the t-test indicated a significant difference in test scores [t(122) = 8.26, p <
.0001. The raw mean difference was 5.6 lower for Blacks than Whites. The standardized
difference (Cohen's d) was 1.03 such that Blacks scored 1.03 SD lower than Whites.
Thus, there was a large effect for the difference between Blacks and Whites on the
cognitive ability test.
Size of Black-White mean differences on the basic knowledge test. The mean
scores on the basic knowledge tests were 16.88, (SD = 5.70) and 20.79, (SD = 5.16) for
Blacks and Whites, respectively. Thus, Blacks scored less than one SD lower than
Whites on the basic knowledge test. Results of the t-test indicated a significant
difference in test scores [t(122) = 5.86, p < .0001. The raw mean difference was 3.91
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lower for Blacks than Whites. The standardized difference (Cohen's d) was 0.75 such
that Blacks scored 3/4ths of one SD lower than Whites. However, similar to the effect
size found for the cognitive ability test, these results indicate a large effect for the
difference between Blacks and Whites on the basic knowledge test. Thus, Hypothesis 1b
(H1b) was not supported.
Size of Black-White mean differences on the understanding test. The mean scores
on the understanding tests were 10.89, (SD = 4.99) and 15.46, (SD) = 4.79 for Blacks and
Whites, respectively. Thus, Blacks scored less than one SD lower than Whites on the test
of understanding. Results of the t-test indicated a significant difference in test scores
[t(122) = 37.05, p < .0001. The raw mean difference was 4.57 lower for Blacks than
Whites. The standardized difference (Cohen's d) was 0.95 such that Blacks scored 95%
of one SD lower than Whites. However, these results indicate also a large effect for the
difference between Blacks and Whites on the understanding test. Thus, Hypothesis 1c
(H1c) was not supported.
The Role of Cognitive Ability and Knowledge as Predictors of Performance (Hypothesis
2)
To examine the effectiveness of cognitive ability, basic knowledge, and
understanding for predicting performance, I performed a series of three regression
analyses with repeated measures. Specifically, I regressed performance in the three posttest task trials (T3 – T5) on the cognitive ability, basic knowledge, and understanding test
scores, individually. Each regression allowed me to determine the amount of variance in
performance (R2) that was associated with each of the predictors. I would have support
for my predictions (H2a, H2b, H2c) if the amount of variance accounted for is largest for
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understanding, smaller for basic knowledge, and smallest for cognitive ability.
Cognitive ability effects on task performance. The first repeated measures
regression analysis examined the effect of cognitive ability on task performance in Trials
3 - 5. Results indicated a significant effect for Trial [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.90, F(2, 243) =
13.30, p < .0001]. Performance improved across trials (M = 648.84, 994.92, and 1210.07
for Trials 3, 4, and 5, respectively). Additionally, results indicated a significant main
effect for cognitive ability [F(1, 244) = 35.38, p < .0001, β = 0.36]. There was no
significant interaction effect [Trial X Cognitive Ability: Wilks’ Lambda = 0.98, F(2,
243) = 2.06, p = 0.13].
Basic knowledge effects on task performance. The second repeated measures
regression analysis examined the effect of basic knowledge on performance in Trials 3 5. Results indicated a significant effect for Trial [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.90, F(2, 243) =
12.63, p < .0001]. Performance improved across trials. Additionally, results indicated a
significant main effect for basic knowledge [F(1, 244) = 109.60, p < .0001, β = 0.56].
There was no significant interaction effect [Trial X Basic knowledge: Wilks’ Lambda =
0.99, F(2, 243) = 1.21, p = 0.30].
Understanding effects on task performance. The third repeated measures
regression examined the effect of understanding on performance in Trials 3 - 5. Results
indicated a significant effect for Trial [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.85, F(2, 243) = 21.40, p <
.0001]. Performance improved across trials. Additionally, results indicated a significant
main effect for understanding [F(1, 244) = 123.27, p < .0001, β =0.58]. There was no
significant interaction effect [Trial X Understanding: Wilks’ Lambda = 0.99, F(2, 243) =
1.79, p = 0.17].
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Test of Hypothesis 2. To test Hypotheses 2a, 2b, and 2c directly, I had to compare
the variance accounted for by each test. To complete this comparison process, first, I
determined the amount of variance (R2) in performance accounted for by each of the three
tests using a series of regression analyses. Regression results indicated that cognitive
ability accounted for 13% of the variance in average performance across trials [(R2) =
0.126], basic knowledge accounted for 31% of the variance [(R2) = 0.309], and
understanding accounted for 34% of the variance in average performance across task
trials [(R2) = 0.336].
Then, to examine the significance of the differences in variance accounted for by
the tests, I performed a series of t-test calculations of dependent r as described in Cohen
and Cohen (1975). I completed this calculation process was complete three times in
order to compare: 1) the cognitive ability test to the basic knowledge test, 2) the
cognitive ability test to the understanding test, and 3) the basic knowledge test to the
understanding test.
Results indicated that the basic knowledge test accounted for significantly more
variance than the cognitive ability test [t(77) = 2.214, p < .05]. Thus Hypothesis 2a was
supported. Also, results indicated that the understanding test accounted for significantly
more variance than the cognitive ability test [t(77) = 2.632, p < .05]. Thus Hypothesis 2b
was supported. Finally, results indicated that the understanding test failed to account for
significantly more variance than the basic knowledge test [t(77) = 0.673, p > .05]. Thus
Hypothesis 2c was not supported.
Knowledge as a Mediator of Ability Effects on Task Performance (Hypothesis 3)
To examine knowledge as a mediator in the cognitive ability - performance
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relationship (H3a, H3b), I used procedures described by Baron and Kenny (1986) to
examine the proposed mediation effects for basic knowledge and understanding.
To demonstrate mediation, the procedures require that preliminary tests
demonstrate significant relationships between the variables in each “link” or “pathway”
in the proposed model. That is, the predictor variable (cognitive ability) must
demonstrate a significant effect on the criterion variable (performance), the predictor
variable (cognitive ability) must demonstrate a significant effect on the mediating
variable (basic knowledge or understanding), and the mediating variable (basic
knowledge or understanding) must significantly affect the criterion variable
(performance). Then, to provide evidence of complete mediation, one must demonstrate
that the effect of the predictor variable (cognitive ability) on the criterion variable
(performance) is reduced to a non-significant level when both the predictor variable
(cognitive ability) and mediator (basic knowledge or understanding) variable are entered
into the model. However, one can provide evidence of partial mediation if one can
demonstrate 1) that the increment or change in the amount of variance (∆R2) in the
criterion variable accounted for by the mediator variable is not significantly increased by
entering the predictor variable into the model, or 2) a significant reduction in the effect of
the predictor variable on the criterion variable in the presence of the mediator. In the
current study, an increase in the variance accounted for by the predictor variable was
tested using a procedure described by Cohen and Cohen (1975) and a reduction in the
effect of the predictor variable in the presence of the mediator was assessed using the
Sobel test (Baron & Kenny, 1986).
Basic Knowledge as a Mediator of Cognitive Ability Effects on Performance (Hypothesis
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3a)
Effect of the predictor (cognitive ability) on the criterion (task performance). As
reported above, results demonstrated a significant main effect for cognitive ability on task
performance [F(1, 244) = 35.38, p < .0001, β = 0.36]. Thus cognitive ability was
positively related to task performance. Cognitive ability accounted for 13% of the
variance in average performance across trials [(R2) = 0.126].
Effect of the mediator (basic knowledge) on the criterion (task performance). As
reported above, results indicated a significant main effect for basic knowledge [F(1, 244)
= 109.60, p < .0001, β = 0.56]. Thus, basic knowledge was positively related to task
performance. Basic knowledge accounted for 31% of the variance [(R2) = 0.309] in task
performance.
Effect of the predictor (cognitive ability) on the mediator (basic knowledge). I
regressed basic knowledge on cognitive ability. Results revealed a significant effect
[F(1, 244) = 99.48, p < .001, β = 0.54, R2 = .289]. Thus, cognitive ability was positively
related to basic knowledge, accounting for 29% of the variance.
Effects of both the predictor (cognitive ability) and the mediator (basic
knowledge) on the criterion (task performance). Finally, to examine basic knowledge as
a mediator, I entered cognitive ability into the model after controlling for the effects of
basic knowledge. Results indicated a main effect for basic knowledge [F(1, 244) =
66.56, β = 0.51, p < .0001]. The effect of cognitive ability fell to a non-significant level
[F(1, 244) = 1.58, β = 0.08, p = 0.21], after controlling for the effect of basic knowledge.
The variance in overall task understanding remained at 31% (R2 = .314). That is, no
significant incremental variance was accounted for by adding cognitive ability effects
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(which accounted for 13% of the variance in task performance) into the model. Thus,
basic knowledge completely mediated the effects of cognitive ability on task
performance, thereby failing to provide support for Hypothesis 3a.
Understanding as a Mediator of Cognitive Ability Effects on Performance (Hypothesis
3b)
Effect of the predictor (cognitive ability) on the criterion (task performance). As
stated above, cognitive ability had a significant effect on task performance [F(1, 244) =
35.38, p < .0001, β = 0.36]. Thus cognitive ability was positively related to task
performance, accounting for 13% of the variance in average performance across trials
[(R2) = 0.126].
Effect of the mediator (understanding) on the criterion (task performance). As
reportd above, understanding had a significant effect on task performance [F(1, 244) =
123.27, p < .0001, β = 0.58]. Thus, understanding was positively related to task
performance, accounting for 34% of the variance [(R2) = 0.336] in task performance.
Effect of the predictor (cognitive ability) on the mediator (understanding). I
regressed understanding on cognitive ability. Results revealed a significant effect [F(1,
244) = 126.13, p < .001, β = 0.59, R2 = .341]. Thus, cognitive ability was positively
related to understanding, accounting for 34% of the variance.
Effects of both the predictor (cognitive ability) and the mediator (understanding)
on the criterion (task performance). Finally, to examine understanding as a mediator, I
entered cognitive ability into the model after controlling for the effects of understanding.
Results indicated a main effect for understanding [F(1, 244) = 76.68, β = 0.56, p <
.0001]. The effect of cognitive ability fell to a non-significant level [F(1, 244) = 0.17, β
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= 0.03, p = 0.68] after controlling for the understanding effect. The variance in overall
task understanding remained at 34% (R2 = .336). That is, no significant incremental
variance was accounted for by adding cognitive ability effects (which accounted for 13%
of the variance in task performance) into the model. Thus, understanding completely
mediated the effects of cognitive ability on task performance, providing support for
Hypothesis 3b.
The Role of the Race x Test Performance Interaction in Task Performance (Research
Question 1): An Examination of Test Fairness.
To examine the question of test bias/test fairness for all tests (Research Question
1), I performed a series of regressions with repeated measures (i.e., task performance
trials) to examine the effects of race and test performance on task performance. The test
would be considered unfair if it predicted performance differentially for the two racial
subgroups (Blacks and Whites).
Race x Cognitive Ability interaction effects on task performance. I examine first
the fairness of the cognitive ability test. Results indicated no significant effects on
performance for the between subject effects of race [F(1, 242) = 0.23, p = 0.63],
cognitive ability [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.98, F(1, 242) = 0.95, p = 0.33], or Race X
Cognitive Ability [F(1, 242) = 0.52, p = 0.469]. Also, results indicated no significant
effects on performance for the within subject effects for Trial [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.98,
F(2, 241) = 2.31, p = 0.10], Trial X Race [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.99, F(2, 241) = 0.798, p =
0.45], Trial X Cognitive Ability [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.996, F(2, 241) = 0.44, p = 0.64], or
Trial X Race X Cognitive Ability [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.998, F(2, 241) = 0.29, p = 0.75].
Thus, the cognitive ability test showed no signs of differential prediction.
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Race x Basic Knowledge interaction effects on task performance. Next, I
examined the fairness of the basic knowledge test. Results indicated significant between
subject effects for basic knowledge [F(1, 242) = 14.53, p < .001] but not for race [F(1,
242) = .05, p = .82] or Race X Basic Knowledge [F(1, 242) = 1.08, p = .30]. Thus, basic
knowledge significantly affected task performance.
Additionally, results indicated significant within subject effects for Trial X Race
[Wilks’ Lambda = 0.96, F(2, 241) = 5.08, p < .01] as well as a significant effect for Trial
X Race X Basic Knowledge [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.97, F(2, 241) = 4.09, p < .05],
indicating that the basic knowledge test predicted performance differently for the two
races in different task trials. In examining this effect, results indicated that the Race X
Basic Knowledge interaction effect was significant in Trial 3 [F(1, 242) = 6.24, p < .05].
Moreover, follow-up analyses indicated a stronger effect of basic knowledge on task
performance for Whites [F(1, 122) = 52.42, p < .0001, β = .55] than for Blacks [F(1, 122)
= 31.57, p < .0001, β = .45]. However, the Race X Basic knowledge effect was nonsignificant in the later task trials [F(1, 242) = 0.39, p = .53 and F(1, 242) = 0.01, p = .91,
for Trials 4 & 5, respectively]. There were no other significant effects [Trial: Wilks’
Lambda = 0.99, F(2, 241) = 0.675, p = .51; Trial X Basic Knowledge: Wilks’ Lambda =
0.98, F(2, 241) = 1.96, p = .14]. Thus, basic knowledge significantly predicted
performance in all task trials. However, the test used to measure basic knowledge
predicted early task performance differentially for Blacks and Whites and therefore,
should be considered unfair.
Race x Understanding interaction effects on task performance. Finally, I
examined the fairness of the understanding test in predicting task performance. Results
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indicated significant between subject effects for understanding [F(1, 242) = 16.36, p <
.0001] but not for race [F(1, 242) = 0.30, p = .58] or Race X Understanding [F(1, 242) =
0.50, p = .48]. Thus, understanding significantly affected task performance.
Additionally, results indicated significant within subject effects for Trial X Race
[Wilks’ Lambda = 0.968, F(2, 241) = 3.90, p < .05]. Follow-up analyses indicated that
Blacks performed lower than Whites in all three task trials, and that difference was larger
in Trial 4 [Blacks: M = 362.04, SD = 662.23, M = 647.22, SD = 844.30, M = 879.20, SD
= 885.19; Whites: M = 935.63, SD = 862.53, M = 1342.62, SD = 814.87, M = 1540.93,
SD = 773.90, for Trials 3, 4 and 5, respectively]. There were no other significant effects
[Trial: Wilks’ Lambda = 0.98, F(2, 241) = 2.57, p = .08; Trial X Understanding: Wilks’
Lambda = 0.99, F(2, 241) = 1.25, p = .28; Trial X Race X Understanding [Wilks’
Lambda = 0.98, F(2, 241) = 2.54, p = .08]. Thus, understanding significantly predicted
performance in all task trials and the test used to measure understanding showed no signs
of differential prediction and therefore should be considered fair.
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Study 2
As stated earlier, in Study 1, I did not implement a direct measure of stereotype
threat. I omitted this direct measure intentionally because of the possibility that including
a direct measure could make stereotype threat salient to the participants and that any
effects of stereotype threat could then carry over to influence other outcomes of the
study. However, theoretically, stereotype threat effects may cause the test score
differences between Blacks and Whites.
Therefore, I designed a second study to assess directly the incidence of perceived
stereotype threat relative to cognitive ability and the job knowledge tests used in Study 1.
That is, I designed the second study to measure stereotype directly relative to both types
of written tests. Furthermore, this study included the assumption that the test of
understanding is the better of the two job knowledge measures. Thus, I included only the
understanding test for comparison to the cognitive ability test for its induction of
stereotype threat perceptions.
Furthermore, as stated earlier also, and consistent with previous research,
cognitive ability tests generally produce significant black-white mean score differences.
If these differences are, in fact, the result of perceived stereotype threat, then whereas
Blacks should perceive the tests as threatening, whites should not have the same
perceptions. This thinking led to my first hypothesis.
H1: Blacks will perceive the tests as more (stereotype) threatening than Whites.
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Further, as stated earlier also, because it is cognitive ability tests that generally
produce significant black-white mean score differences, if these differences are the result
of perceived stereotype threat then the cognitive ability test itself is likely causing those
perceptions. However, as argued earlier, a job knowledge test should not be perceived as
threatening and should therefore produce weaker stereotype threat perceptions.
H2:

The cognitive ability test will produce stronger perceptions of stereotype threat

relative to the understanding test.
Method
Participants
Participants (N = 102) were undergraduate students at a medium-sized midwestern university. Of these, I obtained 74 from a pool of undergraduate students
enrolled in introductory psychology classes. I recruited the remaining 28 participants
from advanced psychology classes. All students participated in exchange for extra credit
points. Of these, 41 were African Americans (10 males, 31 females), 57 were White
Americans (21 males, 36 females), 3 were Asian Americans (females), and 1 was an
Hispanic American (female).
Task Description
Participants performed an adaptation of an existing computer-based truck
dispatching simulation task (Steele-Johnson & Perlow, 1989). This task required
participants to receive, process, and ship orders of military parts and supplies to various
areas within an Area of Responsibility (A.O.R.). Eight rules constrained the processing
of these orders. Rules included information about identifying order types, order delivery
schedules, truck capacity restrictions, and delivery area restrictions. Running task time
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was identified as the time spanning one working week. That is, the task time began at
9:00 a.m. on Monday and ended at 5:00 p.m. Friday. Each hour interval in the task was
equivalent to 15 seconds in real time. Each day in the task corresponded to two minutes
in real time. Each task trial lasted 10 minutes. All participants received task instructions
prior to attempting the task.
Measures
Cognitive ability. I assessed cognitive ability using the first 10 questions of the
Wonderlic Personnel Test (Wonderlic, C., 2002) used in Study 1. (See Study 1, p. 41 for
sample test items and descriptive information for the test.) I administered the test in a
paper-and-pencil format. I did not calculate test score because the test was used only as a
reference to generate test perceptions.
Understanding. I assessed understanding using the first 10 questions of the
understanding (job knowledge) test used in Study 1. (See Appendix B) I administered
the test in a paper-and-pencil format. I did not calculate test score because the test was
used only as a reference to generate test perceptions.
Stereotype threat. I assessed stereotype threat was assessed using an 8-item scale
developed by Ployhart, Ziegert, & McFarland (2003). I administered the scale in a paperand-pencil format. Participants rated the degree to which they agreed with each question
on a 7-point Likert-type scale with 1 representing “Strongly Disagree” and 7 representing
“Strongly Agree”. Ployhart et al. (2003) reported an internal reliability coefficient of .81
for this measure.
Test perceptions. I assessed test perceptions using the paper-and-pencil measure
designed for Study 1. The two items used in Study 2 addressed the perception of a test as
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a measure of intelligence and as a measure of knowledge (See Appendix C in Study 1 for
more information.). Participants rated the degree to which they agreed with each
question on a 7-point Likert-type scale with 1 representing “Strongly Disagree” and 7
representing “Strongly Agree”.
Demographics. I collected demographic information after administering both of
the tests, using the paper-and-pencil measure designed for Study 1 (See Appendix D).
Demographic items included age, race, gender, college ranking (freshman, sophomore,
junior, senior), and college major.
General perceptions. I assessed general perceptions about the fixedness (or
malleability) of both intelligence and job knowledge using the paper-and-pencil measure
designed for Study 1. (See Study 1, p. 45 for more information.)
Test Order Manipulation and Procedure
To examine the possibility that exposure to one test triggers stereotype threat and
that this threat influences performance on the next test, I implemented two testing
conditions. More specifically, it may be the case that individuals perceive the first test as
threatening and then, once activated, this threat perception carries over to influence
performance on the second. Therefore, I divided participants into two groups such that
one half received the cognitive ability test, followed by the understanding test; the second
group received the tests in the opposite order. Figure 2 shows the order of administration
of experimental procedures for both testing conditions.
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Figure 2: Experimental Procedure for Study Two

To ensure that participants could perceive the relevance (or lack thereof) of the
two tests (understanding and cognitive ability) to the task, each participant received task
instructions and performed one 10-minute trial of the task. Next, participants completed
the written measures of cognitive ability and task understanding, with the order
depending on condition. Immediately after completing the first test, participants
completed the measures of stereotype threat (ST) and of test perceptions (TP) for that
test. Then, participants completed the second test followed immediately by another
measure of stereotype threat (ST) and test perceptions (TP). Finally, participants
completed the demographics questionnaire and the general perceptions (GP) measure at
the end of the experimental session. Note: Providing demographic information only at
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the end of the session eliminated the possibility of making race salient to the participants
prior to their completion of knowledge or ability measures.
Results
Sample Characteristics
Participants (N = 102) were run in one of two experimental conditions which
differed only in the order of administration of the two (cognitive ability and job
knowledge) tests. In Condition 1, the understanding test preceded the cognitive ability
test. In Condition 2 the test order was reversed. I observed no missing values for any test
or survey response options. Further, I examined the data for the presence of possible
outliers (responses beyond the possible scale) and/or response bias but observed none.
Therefore, all individual data were available for use in the analyses.
In order to compare even numbers of African American participants to Whites, I
had to reduce the sample. I accomplished this reduction by eliminating all 3 Asian
American participants and the 1 Hispanic American participant. Then I used a random
number generator to select participants to remove on the basis of race. Of the resulting
sample (n = 80), 40 were African American, 40 were White with 20 from each subgroup
per testing condition. I used this sample in all analyses comparing Blacks to Whites.
Means, Standard Deviations, and Intercorrelations between Study Variables
Means, standard deviations, and intercorrelations between Study 2 variables are
shown in Table 4.
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Table 4
Means, Standard Deviations, and Correlations of Study 2 Variables

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9

Variable

Mean

SD

1

2

Race
TPCAT1
TPCAT2
TPUND1
TPUND2
STPCAT
STPUND
GenPerc1
GenPerc2

----4.87
3.25
3.79
5.23
2.99
2.98
2.69
6.35

-----1.53 .02
-1.96 -.19 -.13
1.94 -.17
.25
1.71 .07
.29*
0.94 -.43† .01
0.94 -.51† -.04
1.79 -.09 -.02
1.02 -.09
.20

3

-.07
-.15
.18
.21
.03
-.13

4

-.27*
.19
.29**
.19
-.16

5

6

7

8

9

--.07
-.01
-.17
.15

-.85†
-.02
.06

-.13
-.10

--.13

--

* p < .05, ** p < .01, *** p < .001, † p < .0001.
Key:
TPCAT1
TPCAT2
TPUND1
TPUND2
STPCAT
STPUND
GenPerc1
GenPerc2

Perceptions of the Cognitive Ability Test as a measure of intelligence
Perceptions of the Cognitive Ability Test as a measure of knowledge
Perceptions of the Understanding Test as a measure of intelligence
Perceptions of the Understanding Test as a measure of knowledge
Perceptions of Stereotype Threat Associated with the Cognitive Ability Test
Perceptions of Stereotype Threat Associated with the Undrsatnding Test
Perceptions of Intelligence as fixed, unchangable
Perceptions of Job Knowledge as Malleable

Initial Group Differences
To check for initial group differences, I compared the means for the variables
within each condition (i.e., Test Order) subgroup. As stated earlier, in both groups, 50%
of the participants were African American and 50% were White. Also, in Condition 1, 27
participants were female, (11 White, 16 Black) 13 were male (9 White, 4 Black)
compared to 28 females (13 White, 15 Black) and 12 males (7 White, 5 Black) in
Condition 2. Further, the age ranges for the two groups were similar (i, e., participants in
Test Order 1 ranged in age from 17 to 24, M = 19.5 years; and from 17 to 32, M = 20.05
years in Test Order 2). Therefore, I concluded that minimal differences existed between
the two groups and that race, age and gender were evenly distributed across both test
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order conditions.
Analysis Approach
To examine my hypotheses and in exploratory analyses, I performed a series of
repeated measures anovas with condition (test order), race, and test type (ability,
knowledge) as predictors and perceptions as outcomes. Test type was the only within
subject factor. I included condition in the analysis to examine and control for the effects
of test order on perceptions.
Effects of Condition, Race, and Test Type on Stereotype Threat Perceptions (Hypotheses
1 and 2)
Results indicated a significant main effect of Race [F(1, 76) = 24.65, p < .0001]
such that Blacks [M = 3.42, SD = 0.91 perceived the tests as more threatening than
Whites [M = 2.55, SD = 0.66]. Thus, Hypothesis 1, which stated that “Blacks will
perceive the tests as more (stereotype) threatening than Whites.” was supported.
However, results indicated no significant effect for Test Type on stereotype threat
perceptions [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.999, F(1, 76) = 0.472, p = 0.829]. The tests were
perceived as similarly threatening [M = 2.99, SD = 0.94 for stereotype perceptions for the
cognitive ability test, and M = 2.98, SD = 0.94, for stereotype perceptions associated with
the understanding test]. Therefore, Hypothesis 2, which stated that “The cognitive ability
test will produce stronger perceptions of stereotype threat relative to the understanding
test.” was not supported. There were no other significant effects (see Table 5).
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Table 5
Effects of condition, race, and test type on stereotype threat perceptions

Predictor
Between Subjects:
Condition
Race
Condition X Race
Within Subjects:
Test Type
Test Type X Race
Test Type X Condition
Test Type X Race X Condition

Wilks’ λ

0.99
0.98
0.98
0.99

F(1, 76)

p

3.40
24.65†
0.07

0.07
-0.79

0.47
1.56
1.56
0.75

0.83
0.22
0.22
0.39

† p < .0001

Effects of Condition, Race, and Test Type on Test Perceptions
To better understand the influence of race and test type on perceptions relevant to
stereotype threat, I examined the effects of these variables on perceptions of the tests as
measures of intelligence and as measures of knowledge, using the analysis approach
described above and again controlling for the effects of test order. I then repeated these
analyses to examine effects on perceptions of intelligence as fixed and of knowledge as
malleable.
Effects of condition, race, and test type on perceptions of the tests as measures of
intelligence. In examining effects on the perception of the tests as a measure of
intelligence, results indicated a significant effect for test type [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.79,
F(1, 76) = 20.41, p < .0001, M = 4.88, SD = 1.53 and M = 3.78, SD = 1.94, for the
cognitive ability test and the understanding test, respectively]. There were no other
significant effects (see Table 6).
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Table 6
Effects of condition, race, and test type on perceptions of the tests
as measures of intelligence.
Predictor
Between Subjects:
Condition
Race
Condition X Race
Within Subjects:
Test Type
Test Type X Race
Test Type X Condition
Test Type X Race X Condition

Wilks’ λ

0.788
0.971
0.998
0.997

F(1, 76)

p

2.53
1.04
0.37

0.11
0.31
0.54

20.41†
2.27
0.13
0.22

-0.14
0.72
0.64

† p < .0001

Effects of condition, race, and test type on perceptions of the tests as measures of
knowledge. In examining effects on perceptions of the tests as measures of knowledge,
results indicated a significant effect for test type [Wilks’ Lambda = 0.66, F(1, 76) =
39.88, p < .0001, M = 3.25, SD = 1.96 and M = 5.22, SD = 1.71, for the cognitive ability
test and the understanding test, respectively]. Thus, participants perceived the
understanding test as a stronger measure of knowledge than the cognitive ability test.
Also, results indicated a significant main effect for Condition [F(1, 76) = 11.35, p < .01].
There were no other significant effects (see Table 7).
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Table 7
Effects of condition, race, and test type on perceptions of the tests
as measures of knowledge.
Predictor
Between Subjects:
Condition
Race
Condition X Race
Within Subjects:
Test Type
Test Type X Race
Test Type X Condition
Test Type X Race X Condition

Wilks’ λ

0.66
0.97
0.99
0.99

F(1, 76)

p

11.35**
0.98
0.80

-0.32
0.38

39.88,†
2.56
0.10
0.06

-0.11
0.75
0.81

**p < .01, † p < .0001

To explore the effect of condition, I examined the means for the two tests within
each condition. Results indicated that, regardless of test type, providing the
understanding test first (Condition 1) resulted in perceiving the tests more strongly as
measures of knowledge [M = 4.66, SD = 1.06] and providing the cognitive ability test
first (Condition 2) resulted in perceiving the tests less strongly as measures of knowledge
[M = 3.81, SD = 1.19].
Effects of condition and race on perceptions of intelligence as fixed and/or
knowledge as malleable. First, I examined the effects of condition and race on the
perception of intelligence as fixed (see Table 8). Results indicated no significant effects
of Condition [F(1, 76) = 0.32, p = 0.57], Race [F(1, 76) = 0.67, p = 0.42], or Condition X
Race [F(1, 76) = 2.87, p = 0.09]. Next, I examined the effects of condition and race on
the perception of knowledge as malleable (see Table 8). Again, there were no significant
effects of Condition [F(1, 76) = 0.00, p = 1.00], Race [F(1, 76) = 0.76, p = 0.38], or
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Condition X Race [F(1, 76) = 1.72, p = 0.19]. Thus, all participants failed to report the
perception that intelligence was fixed and all participants viewed their knowledge as
malleable.

Table 8
Effects of condition and race on perceptions of:
Intelligence as Fixed and/or Job Knowledge as Malleable
Predictor

F(1, 76) p

Cond1
M, SD

Cond2
Blacks
M, SD M, SD

Whites
M, SD

Intelligence-Fixed:
Condition
0.32 0.57 2.80, 1.94 2.58, 1.64
Race
0.67 0.42
2.85, 2.01 2.52, 1.55
Condition X Race
2.87 0.09
Knowledge-Malleable:
Condition
0.00 1.00 6.35, 2.58 6.35, 0.80
Race
0.76 0.38
6.45, 0.81 6.25, 1.19
Condition X Race
1.72 0.19
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DISCUSSION
Study 1 Discussion
Purpose
The overall purpose of Study 1 was to examine the possibility of reducing adverse
impact in selection by implementing the use of job knowledge tests for predicting job
performance. I accomplished this by comparing the effectiveness of two job knowledge
tests for predicting task performance to that of a cognitive ability test. Also, I assessed
job knowledge as a mechanism through which cognitive ability affects task performance.
Further, I designed the two job knowledge tests to explore different conceptualizations of
job knowledge and compared the efficacy of each for predicting performance. Finally, I
examined the effects of perceived stereotype threat as a possible cause of Black-White
score differences relative to each of the three (cognitive ability and both job knowledge)
tests.
Contributions
This study contributed to current theory and research by integrating concepts from
cognitive psychology, industrial-organizational psychology, and social psychology in an
effort to improve existing selection concepts and procedures. Specifically, first this study
contributed to existing selection theory and research by extending our current
conceptualization of job knowledge. This extension provided an alternative method of
defining and measuring job knowledge.
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Second, this study extended our current understanding of the efficacy of cognitive
ability and job knowledge as predictors of performance. Results indicated that both job
knowledge tests predicted performance better than the test of cognitive ability. This
comparison extended our current understanding of the effectiveness of using these two
test types for selection.
Third, this study extended our current understanding of job knowledge as a
mechanism through which cognitive ability affects performance. Results indicated that
job knowledge completely mediated the ability – performance relationship. Thus, this
study extended our current knowledge of the mediating effects of job knowledge in the
cognitive ability – performance relationship. Therefore, it may be possible to replace
cognitive ability tests with tests of job knowledge in the selection process.
Fourth, this study extended our current knowledge of proposed causes of
stereotype threat perceptions. Results indicated that individuals were able to distinguish
between what each test was designed to measure. Specifically, participants perceived the
cognitive ability test as a measure of intelligence and the job knowledge tests as measures
of knowledge. Further, results indicated that individuals failed to perceive their
intelligence as a fixed, stable characteristic. Thus, this study extended current theoretical
conceptualizations relative to the proposed cause of perceived stereotype threat.
Finally, this study extended our current knowledge of perceived stereotype threat
effects on differences in Black-White test score performance. Results indicated no
significant reduction of Black-White test score differences for either job knowledge test
relative to the cognitive ability test. Therefore, this study extended existing theory
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relative to selection tests by comparing the Black-White score differences on each type of
test.
Theoretical Issues and Implications
One theoretical issue that must be addressed is the extension of our current
theoretical conceptualization of job knowledge. Much of current, existing theory has
identified job knowledge as including only declarative and procedural information. Thus,
many researchers have focused on this concept for defining and measuring job
knowledge in their research (e.g., Anderson, Greeno, Kline, & Neves, 1981; Hunter,
1993; Schmidt, Hunter, & Outerbridge, 1986; Martocchio, 1994). However, others have
attempted to extend this conceptualization of job knowledge, and thus, its definition and
measurement techniques to include other components of knowledge (e.g., Greeno, 1989;
Greeno, Riley, & Gelman, 1984; Hedlund, Forsythe, Horvath, Williams, Snook, &
Sternberg, 2003; Schmidt & Hunter, 1993; Sternberg, 1985; Greeno & Simon, 1988; and
Bell & Kozlowski, 2002a, 2002b).
The results of the current study have demonstrated the importance of the
extension of the concept of job knowledge within the theoretical literature. In the current
study, both measures of job knowledge effectively predicted performance. However,
when job knowledge was viewed as declarative and procedural information only, “basic
knowledge,” the test that was developed using this concept exhibited differential
prediction for the two racial subgroups. Alternatively, the concept of job knowledge as
including other knowledge components led to the development of a test that accounted
for slightly more variance in performance than the basic knowledge test and demonstrated
no such differential prediction. Thus, selection theory should include this extended

90

concept of job knowledge to improve selection testing for prediction and to investigate
further the possible reduction of adverse impact.
Another theoretical issue that has been a focus of the study is the mediation of the
relationship of cognitive ability and performance by job knowledge. Much of the
existing research has touted cognitive ability as the best predictor of performance on the
job. To date, many theorists and researchers seem to have adhered to this type of
cognitive ability as the ‘be all, end all’ model for predicting performance (e.g., Ree &
Earles, 1991; Ree, Earles, & Teachout, 1994).
However, some research has identified job knowledge as a mechanism through
which cognitive ability may affect performance. This line of research, mostly
investigated by Hunter, Schmidt, and their colleagues, throughout the 1980s and 1990s,
has attempted to examine job knowledge as a mediator in the cognitive ability –
performance relationship. In that earlier mediation literature, however, whether due to
the sample used, or the type of task, or the technique for measuring job knowledge, the
authors reported only partial mediation of the relationship (e.g., Hunter, 1986, Hunter &
Schmidt 1996), suggesting both direction and indirect effects.
The results of the current study extend that theoretical mediation literature by
demonstrating that, regardless of how job knowledge was measured, complete mediation
was the result. Thus, the current research suggests an indirect effect of cognitive ability
on performance through knowledge acquisition (job knowledge), thereby extending
Hunter’s (1983) model. According to these results, it seems clear that cognitive ability
affects performance through its effect on knowledge acquisition. Thus, a job
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knowledge mediation model is a better theoretical model than that which focuses on
cognitive ability alone as a predictor of performance.
Practical Implications
In a practical sense, (although important for theory as well) these results suggest
that tests of job knowledge may predict performance better than tests of cognitive ability.
Specifically, both job knowledge tests accounted for significantly more variance in
performance than the cognitive ability test. Thus, job knowledge tests could be used to
replace cognitive ability tests in selection. The result would be better prediction of future
job performance.
Further, I would argue that a test of understanding may be more beneficial in
selection than either a test of basic knowledge or cognitive ability. This idea is supported
by the finding that a test of understanding accounts for more variance in performance
than a basic knowledge test. However, it could be suggested that these results
demonstrated that, because the increase in variance accounted for by the understanding
test over that accounted for by the basic knowledge test was not significant statistically,
either type of job knowledge test would be acceptable for use in selection.
In response, I would argue that the difference of 4% of the variance accounted for
was significant in a practical sense. Given the cost of selection and training and the
additional costs associated with re-selection and training for replacements for employees
who were incorrectly hired based on faulty selection procedures, it seems that utility must
be considered. This idea has support in existing research. For example, when
considering test fairness and utility, Hunter, Schmidt, and Rauschenberger (1977)
proposed that, “Because no accepted method for converting minority selection ratios to
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utility units exists, … it was concluded that each personnel researcher or organization
must consider the trade-off between utility and the minority selection ratio
subjectively…” (p. 245). Thus, I would argue that considering the additional costs
associated with ‘mis-hiring’ even one individual who would later either leave the job
voluntarily or be released for poor performance is one practical way of considering utility
for the company.
Further, I would argue that an additional benefit with the use of the understanding
test relates to its ability to predict performance uniformly. Specifically, whereas the basic
knowledge exhibited differential prediction for Blacks and Whites on earliest task
performance, results of this study demonstrated that the understanding test exhibited no
such differential prediction. Given that the purpose of testing is to identify those
individuals who will acquire the relevant, necessary job knowledge earliest, and be able
to perform the job soonest, the focus should be on predicting early task performance.
Using a test that predicts early task performance differentially, such as the basic
knowledge test, would necessarily invite the possibility of causing adverse impact.
Therefore, the understanding type of test should be recommended for selection.
In sum, based on these results, it may be possible to use a test of (job)
understanding in place of a cognitive ability test, in specific situations, for employee
selection, placement, or for promotion. Admittedly, the use of any job knowledge test in
selection requires the applicants to have some experience with the job. The results of the
current study, though, demonstrated that, even with minimal exposure to the task at hand,
individuals can and do acquire job knowledge and that a test of that knowledge is a good
predictor of future performance. Thus one possible setting where the use of this test
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could be advantageous is in an assessment center. Another is in choosing incumbents for
promotion, as was the case in the Ford example. Finally, this test could be beneficial in
any setting where existing measures have been found to result in adverse impact.
Future Research
In study 1 I examined the differences in perceptions relative to the cognitive
ability test and the two job knowledge tests for Blacks and Whites and differences in the
test scores for each racial subgroup. However, other racial and non-racial subgroups are
protected from discrimination under Title 7 as well. Further, previous research has
identified test score differences between the majority and other protected subgroups (e.g.,
women) (e.g., McIntyre, Paulson, & Lord, 2003; Martens, Johns, Greenberg, & Schimel,
2006; Marx & Roman, 2002; Pinel, 1999). Therefore, along with extended research
which compares other combinations of racial sub-groups for differences on these tests,
future research should include an examination of test score differences for males and
females on job knowledge tests as well. Also these examinations should include a
comparison of the efficacy of cognitive ability and job knowledge tests for predicting
performance for males vs. females.
Study Limitations
One limitation of Study 1 was that the sample included university students only.
One could suggest that this sample was ‘more well-educated’ than the population as a
whole. However, I would argue that the open enrollment policy of this university
provided the opportunity to collect a sample of participants with a wide range of
variability in backgrounds, experiences, and abilities. For example, in this sample,
cognitive ability scores were normally distributed, ranging from a score of 7 on the lower
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end to a top score of 35 [M = 21.2, SD = 5.8]. This range is similar to that observed for
employees in general [M = 21.7, SD = 7.6] (Wonderlic, 2002). Furthermore, this student
sample was not limited to introductory psychology students or to undergraduate students
as is often the case in university research. Rather, this sample included students from a
wide variety of university majors, from a wide variety of advanced courses, and from all
levels of college experience (freshman through graduate students) as well. So, I would
argue that the current sample was more representative of the University population and
because of the open enrollment policy more representative of the general population than
is often the case in studies using a college student sample. I would argue further that
because of the variability in backgrounds and experiences, the current sample was more
representative of the general population, that this sample was more likely to represent
those that enter the workforce and, therefore, that these results should be more
generalizable to that workforce population.
A second limitation of Study 1 was that it focused on predicting performance on a
single, non-changing task only. That is, the static task used in this study provided no
opportunity for the measurement of, or demonstration of, decision making performance
in a dynamic job environment. Thus, the tests of “job” knowledge used in this study
were, in actuality, tests of “task” (specific) knowledge and therefore were limited to
sampling knowledge of and predicting performance relative to this one static task alone.
It may be the case that, in a dynamic task environment, where the performance criteria
are changing, a cognitive ability test would be better able to predict performance than a
test of specific task-related knowledge.
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Finally, a third limitation of Study 1 was that the study did not include a direct
measure of stereotype threat perceptions relative to the written tests. This was an
intentional omission because, according to theory (e.g., Steele & Aronson, 1995), simply
making race a salient factor in the study could trigger stereotype threat and thereby alter
the results. A direct measure of perceived stereotype threat would force race to become
salient to all participants. Therefore, I implemented Study 2 to assess stereotype threat
perceptions directly.
Study 2 Discussion
Purpose
The first purpose of Study 2 was to examine directly the occurrence of perceived
stereotype threat relative to a cognitive ability and a job knowledge test. A second
purpose was to examine two of the proposed theoretical causes of this ‘threatening’
perception. One objective was to extend our current knowledge of stereotype treat effects
by testing the theoretical assertion that stereotype threat may cause black-white test score
differences. I accomplished this by examining perceived stereotype threat relative to a
cognitive ability test and a job knowledge (understanding) test. The second objective was
to extend stereotype theory by testing the proposal that Blacks experience stereotype
threat because of perceptions relative to the tests themselves. I accomplished this by
testing 1) whether participants recognized that the cognitive ability test was designed as a
measure of intelligence and that the understanding test was designed as a measure of job
knowledge, and 2) whether participants perceived that their intelligence was a fixed
characteristic. Pursuing these objectives allowed us to extend our current understanding
of the stereotype threat construct.
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Contributions
Study 2 was designed to contribute to current theory and research by examining,
first, whether Blacks held stronger perceptions of stereotype threat than Whites relative to
the two tests. Results indicated that Blacks perceived both tests as more threatening than
Whites. Thus, this study contributed to theory by extending our current knowledge
regarding the types of test on which stereotype threat may have an impact.
Second, this study was designed to contribute to current theory by examining the
possibility that perceiving a test as measure of intelligence was a possible cause of
stereotype threat. Results indicated that Blacks and Whites perceived the cognitive
ability test as a stronger measure of intelligence than the understanding test. Therefore,
this study contributed to existing theory by extending our current knowledge of the
relationship between the perception of the test as a measure of intelligence and the
perception of stereotype threat.
Third, this study extended our knowledge about the perception that a test is a
measure of (job) knowledge. Results indicated that Blacks and Whites perceived the
understanding test as a stronger measure of job knowledge than the cognitive ability test.
Therefore, this study contributed to existing theory by extending our current knowledge
of the relationship between the perception of the test as a measure of knowledge and the
perception of stereotype threat.
Finally, Study 2 extended our current understanding of theory by examining
whether Blacks perceived their intelligence as a fixed, stable, individual characteristic.
Results indicated the Blacks and Whites failed to report the perception that intelligence is
fixed. Thus, this study contributed to theory by extending our current knowledge about
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the relationship between the perception of intelligence as fixed and the perception of
stereotype threat.
Theoretical Issues and Implications
To reiterate, Steele and Aronson (1995) proposed stereotype threat as a possible
cause of the Black-White score differences on cognitive ability tests. Stereotype threat
theory suggests that test score differences are the outcome of knowledge, perceptions,
and beliefs. Specifically, according to the theory, Blacks hold previous knowledge of the
stereotype that members of their racial subgroup generally performed lower than Whites
on intelligence tests. Also, the theory proposes that Blacks perceive cognitive ability
tests as measures of intelligence and that they believe also that their intelligence is a fixed
trait. Further, according to the theory, this combination of perception and belief causes
Blacks to feel the threat that they would confirm that racial stereotype by exhibiting
poorer test performance than Whites. Finally, it is the experience of this threat that
results in lower test scores for Blacks on cognitive ability tests.
However, Steele and Aronson’s (1995) theory did not address the possibility that
stereotype threat might cause Black-Whites score differences on job knowledge tests.
Therefore, I tested whether Black-White differences in perceptions existed for the two
different types of tests. First, I tested whether perceptions of what the test measured
differed for Blacks and Whites for a cognitive ability test. Second, I tested whether the
same perceptions differed between the two groups for a job knowledge test. Finally, I
tested whether stereotype threat was perceived by Black and Whites for each of the two
tests.
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Results indicated that Blacks perceived the tests as more threatening than Whites.
However, contrary to my hypothesis, this threat was perceived for both the job
knowledge and the cognitive ability test. Further, all participants perceived the cognitive
ability test as a stronger measure of intelligence than the job knowledge test and the
understanding test as a stronger measure of job knowledge. Also, and possibly most
importantly, administering the understanding test before the cognitive ability test
“altered” perceptions associated with the cognitive ability test such that the latter was
perceived more strongly as a measure of job-related knowledge rather than intelligence.
Finally, all participants failed to report the view that intelligence was a fixed, stable trait
and all reported the view that job knowledge was malleable. Thus, the theoretical
proposal that the combination of perceiving the test as measuring intelligence and
viewing intelligence as fixed produced stereotype threat (Steele & Aronson, 1995; Steele,
1997) failed to be supported by these results.
Thus, the theoretical implications of the results of Study 2 are that there may be
limitations to existing stereotype theory. That is, the theoretically proposed causes of
stereotype threat perceptions have not been supported in this study. Specifically, I found
that both Blacks and Whites perceived the cognitive ability test as a measure of
intelligence. Thus, these results have demonstrated that this type of perception was not
limited to Blacks and therefore, this study failed to support the assertion that perception
of the test as a measure of intelligence is a possible trigger of stereotype threat for Blacks.
Additionally, I found that both Blacks and Whites perceived the understanding
test as a measure of knowledge, yet the test was perceived still as threatening by Blacks.
Thus, this study contributed to existing theory by demonstrating that, even when the test
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is perceived to measure something other than of intelligence, stereotype threat can still
occur. Therefore, the theory should include an assessment of the possibility that this type
of perception may be related to stereotype threat also.
Finally, I found that neither Blacks nor Whites perceived their intelligence as a
fixed characteristic. Thus, again, the results have failed to support existing theory by
demonstrating that perceptions of intelligence as fixed should not be considered as a
possible trigger of stereotype threat for Blacks. Therefore, these results have eliminated
the possibility of this type of perception from the list of possible causes of stereotype
threat for Blacks as well.
Taken together, these results have clarified specifics of the existing theory
regarding the occurrence of stereotype threat. Further, these results have suggested that
there must, necessarily, be other factors that produce stereotype threat perceptions for
Blacks. Therefore, this study extends our current conceptualization regarding specifically
proposed causes of stereotype threat for Blacks and the perception of stereotype threat
relative to specific selection tests.
Practical Implications
The results of Study 2 provide implications for practice in the area of selection.
Specifically, these results suggest that either type of test can produce perceptions of
stereotype threat for Blacks. More specifically, the practice of replacing cognitive ability
tests with job knowledge tests for selection will not alter Blacks’ perceptions of the test
as being threatening. Thus, rather than directing our focus on reducing or eliminating
stereotype threat relative to testing, practitioners may want to examine other constructs
that have been proposed for the reduction of adverse impact in selection. These could
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include "cultural identification" (Helms, 2002), non-cognitive predictors (Goldstein,
Zedeck, & Goldstein, 2002), and/or composite predictors (Baron & Janmen, 1996;
Sackett & Ellingson, 1997).
Future Research
In Study 2 I focused specifically on stereotype threat theory. Results
demonstrated that existing theory of perceived stereotype threat has limitations.
Specifically, these results suggest that the proposed causes of this threat may be in error.
That is, the results of Study 2 have demonstrated that, whether we use a cognitive ability
or a job knowledge test for employee selection, and no matter what the test is perceived
to measure, and regardless of whether intelligence is viewed as a stable characteristic,
Blacks will perceive the test as threatening. Therefore, future research should examine
other possible ‘predictors’ of stereotype threat perceptions. One suggestion might be to
examine threat associated with the test administration format itself. That is, it could be
the case that the paper-and-pencil testing format is causing the threat. Future research
could compare this format to a test administered via computer.
Study Limitations
This study was limited in that the sample included undergraduate students only.
However, as stated earlier, this group was not limited to introductory psychology
students, as is often the case in university research. Rather, this sample included students
from advanced courses as well. Therefore, I would argue that this sample was more
representative of the University and the general population than is often the case, and
therefore, that these results are more generalizable to the population as a whole.
General Discussion
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Taken together, these two studies have integrated insights from previous research
to examine issues relative to and extend our understanding of the use of tests in selection.
Job knowledge has been identified as a better predictor than cognitive ability. Therefore,
a test of job knowledge could be used in place of cognitive ability tests for employee
selection.
Further, the results of these studies enabled us to extend our concept of job
knowledge beyond that of basic facts and procedures to include more ‘abstract’ decisionmaking information. We can design job knowledge tests that include that more abstract
information as well. The end result is a test of job-related ‘understanding’.
Also, these results have supported the idea that cognitive ability effects
performance through job knowledge. Job knowledge completely mediated the
relationship. Thus, theory should focus on this mediation model.
Finally, the results of both of these studies suggest that we should re-examine
stereotype threat theory. First, (as stated above) investigators should re-examine the
theory to identify actual inducers (predictors) of stereotype threat. Second, because
results demonstrated no changes in the range of score differences for Blacks on the three
tests, stereotype threat should be examined more closely to determine its actual effects on
test performance. Finally, researchers should reinvestigate the effects of perceived
stereotype threat on job performance. In general, results have indicated that Blacks
perform lower than Whites. Isn’t this what we should consider most important? The
bottom line is: Does the perception of stereotype threat on selection tests affect final
performance on the job? According to the results found in these two studies, the answer
is unclear.
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In sum, the results of these studies have suggested that there may exist other
causes of stereotype threat than those proposed by current theory. Specifically,
perceptions of what is measured by the test (e.g., intelligence or knowledge) seem to have
no effect on perceived threat. The same holds true for perceptions of intelligence as a
fixed or malleable construct. Stereotype threat may exist, and it may affect performance
on selection tests, and perhaps even job performance. However, the theoretical
background behind the theory seems to be lacking and therefore, must be reinvestigated
and redefined. In fact, the results of these two studies together suggest that, until
stereotype threat theory is modified and/or clarified, perhaps we should omit this theory
from our quest to reduce adverse impact, rather than directing our focus on reducing or
eliminating stereotype threat relative to testing.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the results of the current studies have demonstrated that stereotype
threat theory must be revisited before it can be beneficial in selection. However, this was
but one of the focuses of the current research. Other objectives have produced results
that have demonstrated that we can replace cognitive ability tests with job knowledge
tests in selection. Also, this research has shown that we can and should implement the
use of a test of job understanding. This implementation will allow us to select employees
using a better test: one with better prediction and that allows for selection of the best
performers, at the outset of their appointment on the job. Further, we can use a test that
results in fewer selection errors. This translates into lower costs due to incorrectly
selecting the ‘wrong’ individuals. Finally, this research has demonstrated that, because
this type of test is free from differential prediction, it is possible to use an understanding
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test to decrease the incidence of adverse impact in selection. Using an understanding test
provides protection from A I. lawsuits because the test is absolutely job-related, and
therefore, legally defensible. Therefore, using a test of job understanding in employee
selection will result in $$$ savings for the organization.
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Footnotes
1

The concept of general cognitive ability or psychometric g was first proposed by Galton

in the late 1800s, and Spearman is credited with early analytical use of psychometric g (in
Ree & Earles, 1991).
2

To clarify, this is not intended as a statement about the effectiveness of Cardio-

Pulmonary Resuscitation, rather, an explanation of a ‘proceduralized’ task. I understand
that the success of C.P.R. depends on several factors including, but not limited to the time
between the onset of the attack and discovery of the victim, access to medical attention,
and the overall health of the victim.
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Appendix A
MVPBas
Participant Number: __________

Learning Test A
Date: ________________

Directions: Please circle the letter that corresponds to the answer that best completes the
question.
IMPORTANT!!! Please DO NOT SKIP ANY QUESTIONS or leave any questions
unanswered.
1. How is a rush order designated?
a. By a "P" in the M column.
b. By a "0" in the M column.
c. By a "1" in the M column.
d. By a "2" in the M column.
e. None of the above.
2. What is accomplished by pressing CTRL-Y?
a. You can ship a truck.
b. You can ship the pickup order(s).
c. You can assign orders to a specific truck.
d. You can send pickup orders to the pickup window.
e. None of the above.
3. A penalty is assessed if you:
a. Assign orders to more than three trucks.
b. Select orders for less than three zones.
c. Ship orders to more than three zones.
d. Accept more than 20 orders.
e. None of the above.
4. Pickup orders must be shipped:
a. On a truck.
b. Either on a truck or to the pickup window.
c. Pickup orders may not be shipped.
d. Via the pickup window.
e. None of the above.
5. Which of the following is true in this task?
a. If you ship a truck that is filled with only regular orders, a penalty is assessed.
b. If you ship a truck that exceeds minimum zone capacity, a penalty is assessed.
c. If you ship a truck that exceeds maximum truck capacity, a penalty is assessed.
d. If you ship a truck that is filled with both regular and rush orders, a penalty is
assessed.
e. None of the above.
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6. What is accomplished by pressing the number keys?
a. You can move between top and bottom windows.
b. You can view the rule associated with that number.
c. You can assign orders to trucks or the pickup window.
d. You can see how many orders you have for processing.
e. None of the above.
7. One day is:
a. The time limit placed on shipping all accepted orders.
b. The time limit placed on shipping regular orders.
c. The time limit placed on shipping incoming orders.
d. The time limit placed on shipping pickup orders.
e. None of the above.
8. What key or keys allow you to ship a pickup order?
a. CTRL-Y.
b. CTRL-A.
c. CTRL-X.
d. CTRL S.
e. None of the above.
9. What is designated by a "P" in the processing (bottom, right-hand) window.
a. The location for assignment of truck capacity.
b. The location for assignment of orders to a specific truck.
c. The location for assignment of incoming orders.
d. The location for assignment of accepted orders.
e. None of the above.
10. What key or keys allow you to move between the top and bottom windows?
a. The ENTER key.
b. The F1 key.
c. The CTRL and A keys.
d. The CTRL and Y keys.
e. None of the above.

11. Which of the following is true in this task?
a. If you take too much time in reading the performance screen, a penalty is
assessed.
b. If you move between the left and right hand windows, a penalty is
assessed.
c. If you move between top and bottom windows too many times, a penalty is
assessed.
d. If you are too slow in accepting new orders, a penalty is assessed.
e. None of the above.
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12. How is a pickup order designated?
a. By a "Y" in the M column.
b. By a "0" in the M column.
c. By a "1" in the M column.
d. By a "2" in the M column.
e. None of the above.
13. A penalty is assessed if you:
a. Ship a whole order to fewer than three zones.
b. Ship a whole order, either by truck or via the pickup window.
c. Ship a pickup order to fewer than three zones.
d. Ship a partial order, either by truck or via the pickup window.
e. None of the above.

14. Which of the following is true in this task?
a. Truck loads exceeding truck capacity by more than 20% may not be shipped.
b. Truck loads must be assigned to 20% of the available delivery zones.
c. Trucks loaded to less than 20% of maximum capacity may not be shipped.
d. Trucks must be loaded within 20% of the task time in order to be shipped.
e. None of the above.
15. What is designated by a "1" in the M column?
a. That the order is a pickup order.
b. That the order is a regular order.
c. That the order is a high-priority order.
d. That the order is a rush order.
e. None of the above.
16. Which of the following is true in this task?
a. If you attempt to ship a truck that is overloaded by more than 20%, a penalty
is assessed.
b. If you attempt to ship a truck to fewer than three zones, a penalty is
assessed.
c. If you attempt to rush deliver the regular orders, a penalty is assessed.
d. If you attempt accept more than 20 orders, a penalty is assessed.
e. None of the above.
17. Which of the following is true in this task?
a. Rush orders must be shipped within two (2) days.
b. Regular orders must be shipped within two (2) days.
c. Incoming orders (orders in queue) must be shipped within two (2) days.
d. Pickup orders must be shipped within two (2) days.
e. None of the above.
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18. What key or keys allow you to ship a pickup order?
a. CTRL-Y.
b. CTRL-A.
c. CTRL-P.
d. CTRL S.
e. None of the above.
19 How is a regular order designated?
a. By a "2" in the M column.
b. By a "1" in the M column.
c. By a "0" in the M column.
d. By a "P" in the M column.
e. None of the above.
20. One day is:
a. The time limit placed on shipping rush orders.
b. The time limit placed on shipping regular orders.
c. The time limit placed on shipping accepted orders.
d. The time limit placed on shipping incoming orders.
e. None of the above.
21. A penalty is assessed if you:
a. Attempt to ship pickup orders via the pickup window.
b. Attempt to ship pickup orders on a truck.
c. Attempt to accept more than 20 orders.
d. Attempt to select orders for fewer than three zones.
e. None of the above.
22. Which of the following is true in this task?
a. Orders accepted for processing must be accepted into the top-right window.
b. Orders accepted for processing must be shipped by the end of task.
c. Orders accepted for processing must be sent to the pickup window.
d. Orders accepted for processing must be assigned to a truck.
e. None of the above.
23. Which of the following is true in this task?
a. If you fail to ship all orders as soon as they are accepted, a penalty is assessed.
b. If you fail to ship all orders within one (1) day, a penalty is assessed.
c. If you fail to ship all regular orders within one (1) day, a penalty is assessed.
d. If you fail to ship all orders on schedule, a penalty is assessed.
e. None of the above.
24. How is a rush order designated?
a. By a "P" in the M column.
b. By a "0" in the M column.
c. By a "1" in the Zone column.
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d. By a "2" in the Zone column.
e. None of the above.
25. What is accomplished by pressing the ENTER key?
a. You can assign orders to a specific truck or the pickup window.
b. You can move between the top and bottom windows.
c. You can accept waiting orders for processing.
d. You can view truck capacity information.
e. None of the above.
26. Three is:
a. The minimum number of zones that a truck may deliver orders to.
b. The maximum number of zones that a truck may deliver orders to.
c. The maximum number of zones that a truck may deliver pickup orders to.
d. The maximum number of times that a truck may deliver orders during the task.
e. None of the above.
27. What is designated by a "P" in the processing (bottom, right-hand) window.
a. The location for assignment of truck capacity.
b. The location for assignment of orders to a specific truck.
c. The location for assignment of a pickup order.
d. The location for assignment of incoming orders.
e. None of the above.
28. What key or keys allow you to ship a truck?
a. CTRL-P.
b. CTRL-A.
c. CTRL-X.
d. CTRL S.
e. None of the above.
29. What is accomplished by pressing CTRL-A?
a. You can ship a truck.
b. You can ship the pickup order(s).
c. You can assign orders to a specific truck.
d. You can send pickup orders to the pickup window.
e. None of the above.
30. What key or keys allow you to ship a pickup order?
a. CTRL-Y.
b. CTRL-A.
c. CTRL-P.
d. CTRL S.
e. None of the above.
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MVPDisUnd
Participant Number: __________

Appendix B
Learning Test B
Date: ________________

Directions: Please circle the letter that corresponds to the answer that best completes the
question.
IMPORTANT!!! Please DO NOT SKIP ANY QUESTIONS or leave any questions
unanswered.
1. Order activation, identification, & assignment are:
a. The activities that are required for successful task verification.
b. The activities that are required for successful task identification.
c. The activities that are required for successful order packaging.
d. The activities that are required for successful order identification.
e. None of the above is true in this task.
2. When the task begins, the first activity you may do is:
a. Press CNTRL-A.
b. Press CNTRL-Y.
c. Use the arrow and ENTER keys.
d. You may do either a. or c. at this time.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
3. When the task begins, you may:
a. Accept, select, and/or package orders for shipping.
b. b. Select, verify, and/or package orders for shipping.
c. Activate, identify, and/or assign orders for shipping.
d. Both a and b are true in this task.
e. None of the above is true in this task.
4. If orders are not processed quickly, what will occur?
a. Penalties may be assigned because of delay in processing orders.
b. Penalties may be assigned because you correctly followed task rules.
c. Your overall score will be decreased because of penalties.
d. Both a and c are true in this task.
e. Only a is true in this task.
5. To activate waiting orders (orders in queue), you must:
a. Determine that there is room for more orders in the bottom, left-hand window.
b. Determine that there is room for more orders in the bottom. right-hand
window.
c. Have space for more orders in the top, right-hand window.
d. Both a and b are true in this task.
e. None of the above is true in this task.
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6. When you accept waiting orders, you are:
a. Selecting those orders for a truck.
b. Activating those orders for processing.
c. Accepting those orders for the pickup window.
d. Shipping those orders on a truck or via the pickup window.
e. None of the above is true in this task.

7. To activate waiting orders (orders in queue), you must:
a. Have space for more orders in the top, left-hand window.
b. Have space for more orders in the bottom. left-hand window.
c. Have space for more orders in the top, right-hand window.
d. You may not activate waiting orders at any time during the task.
e. None of the above is true in this task.
8. To activate waiting orders (orders in queue), you must:
a. Have space for more orders in the bottom, left-hand window.
b. Have space for more orders in the top, right-hand window.
c. Have space for more orders in the bottom, right-hand window.
d. You may activate waiting orders at any time during the task.
e. None of the above is true in this task.
9. What does a "1" in the M column designate?
a. That the order is a rush order.
b. That the order is a regular order.
c. That the order is a pickup order.
d. That the order should be sent to zone 1.
e. None of the above is true in this task.
10. To determine if an order is a rush order, you should first:
a. Look for a "1" in the M column.
b. Look for a "2" in the M column.
c. Look for a "3" in the M column.
d. Look for a "0" in the M column.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
11. How do you determine that an order is not a partial order?
a. By looking at the order's invoice number(s).
b. By looking at the order's identification number(s).
c. By looking at the order's schedule number(s).
d. By looking at the information in the M column.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
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12. What does an order's zone number determine?
a. Where to ship the order by truck.
b. The order's delivery schedule for delivery.
c. How soon the order must be shipped.
d. When to send the order to the pickup window.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
13. To determine if an order should be sent to the pickup window, you should first:
a. Look for a "3" in the M column.
b. Look for a "0" in the M column.
c. Look for a "2" in the M column.
d. Look for a "1" in the M column.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
14. How do you know that an order should be sent to the pickup window?
a. There is a "1" in the zone column for the order.
b. There is a "1" in the M column for the order.
c. The order has been accepted for processing.
d. There is a "5" in the QTY column for the order.
e. None of the above is true in this task.
15. To ship a pickup order:
a. Press ENTER.
b. Press CNTRL-A.
c. Press F1.
d. Press CNTRL-Y.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
16. For pickup orders, you can use the arrow and ENTER keys to:
a. Select and assign the order to a truck.
b. Select and assign the order to the pickup window.
c. Ship the order via the pickup window.
d. Ship the order according to zone.
e. None of the above is true in this task.
17. In order to ship an order by truck, you must first:
a. Determine that a truck is available for a pickup order.
b. Determine that a truck is loaded to its capacity.
c. Determine that a truck is currently delivering orders.
d. Determine that there is room in the queue.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
18. To determine if an order may be shipped with other orders, you should:
a. Look at the information in the M column.
b. Look at the order's zone number and invoice number(s).
c. Look at the number of orders in queue.
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d. Look at the order's truck capacity and weight information.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
19. After assigning orders to a truck, you may:
a. Select orders according to invoice number(s).
b. Assign those orders to the pickup window.
c. Assign different orders to another truck.
d. Accept those orders into the active (processing) window.
e. None of the above is true in this task.
20. After an order has been assigned to a truck, you may:
a. Continue selecting orders for the same truck.
b. Ship the truck.
c. Unload the pickup window.
d. Both a. and b. are possible.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.

21. If you attempt to ship a truck that is overloaded:
a. The truck may go out, but the orders remain in the window.
b. The truck may go out, but the orders remain in the queue.
c. The truck may go out, but a penalty is assessed.
d. The truck will not go out, and a penalty is assessed..
e. None of the above is true in this task.
22. Immediately after shipping a truck, you should:
a. Accept new orders for processing for processing.
b. Ship new orders.
c. Assign orders to a specific truck(s).
d. You may do either a. or c. at this time.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
23. Why would you remove orders from a truck?
a. To avoid getting a penalty because the truck is underloaded.
b. To avoid getting too many orders in the queue.
c. To get more orders from the queue.
d. To avoid a penalty for having too many orders in the queue.
e. None of the above is true in this task.
24. If truckload exceeds truck capacity, you should:
a. Remove excess pieces according to invoice number & QTY information.
b. Remove excess units according to zone number & QTY information.
c. Both a and b are correct.
d. Assign more orders to the truck.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
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25. Immediately after shipping a truck, you should:
a. Press CNTRL-A.
b. Press CNTRL-P.
c. Use the arrow and ENTER keys.
d. You may do either a. or c. at this time.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
26. How do you determine which order(s) should be loaded onto which truck?
a. By looking at the order's zone number.
b. By looking at the M column.
c. By looking at the order's delivery schedule.
d. By looking at the order's capacity number.
e. None of the above is true in this task.
27. After an order has been assigned to the pickup window, you may:
a. Use the CNTRL-Y key(s) to assign the order to a truck.
b. Use the arrow and ENTER keys to select another pickup order.
c. . Use the number and ENTER keys to select another order by zone.
d. Use the CNTRL-Y key(s) to ship the order on a truck.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.

28. How do you determine the number of pieces in an order?
a. By looking at the information in the QTY column.
b. By looking at the order's invoice number(s).
c. By looking at the information in the zone column.
d. By looking at the information in the M column.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
29. After an order has been assigned to the pickup window, you may:
a. Press CNTRL-A to ship the pickup order.
b. Press CNTRL-Y to ship the pickup order.
c. Press CNTRL-S to ship the pickup order.
d. Press ENTER to ship the pickup order.
e. None of the above is the correct activity.
30. If orders are not processed accurately, what will occur?
a. Penalties may be assigned because of rule violation(s).
b. Your overall score will be decreased because of penalties.
c. Both a and b are true in this task.
d. Penalties may be assigned because you correctly followed task rules.
e. Both a and d are true in this task.
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Appendix C
Test Perceptions
Participant Number: __________

Date: ________________

Directions for Survey:
Please read each of the following statements. Rate the extent to which you agree or
disagree with each statement. (Enter the appropriate number on the line before each
question.) Even if you are unsure of an item, please answer it anyway.
_______________________________________________________
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
Strongly
Strongly
disagree
agree
____1. I believe that the test I just completed was designed to measure my general
intelligence.
____2. I believe that the test I just completed was designed to measure my knowledge of
a particular task.
____3. I do not understand what the test had to do with this job.
____4. I can not see any relationship between the test and what I think is required by the
job tasks.
____5. It would be obvious to anyone that this test is related to the job tasks.
____6. The actual content of this test was clearly similar to the job tasks listed above.
____7. Doing well on this test was important to me.
____8. I didn't put much effort into this test.
____9. I tried my best on this test.
____10. While taking this test, I concentrated and tried to do well.
____11. I just didn't care how I did on this test.
____12. I want to be among the top scorers on this test.
____13. I was extremely motivated to do well on this test.

125

Appendix D
Demographics Survey
Participant Number: __________

Date: ___________

Directions for Survey:
Please read and answer each of the following questions. (Please circle the appropriate
letter.) Even if you are unsure of an item, please answer it anyway.

1. Age ________ (Please enter number of years only.)

2. Race
a. African American
b. Asian American
c. Hispanic American
d. White American
e. Other (Please identify) _________________

3.

Gender:
a) Female

4.

College Ranking
a) Freshman

5.

b) Male

b) Sophomore

c) Junior

d) Senior

College Major
a) Business

b) Communications

c) Computers

d) Education

e) Engineering

f) Mathematics

g) Psychology

h) Sociology

i) Other
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